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FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN LESS DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPED REGIONS: COMPONENTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Simon Kuznets

l.

Intro ducti on

The crude birth rates in the econo mica lly less devel
oped coun tries
have been over twice those in the devel oped coun tries
in the recen t
decad es. Such diffe renti als imply diffe rence s in age
patte rns of birth
rates throu gh the life cycle s of moth ers and fathe rs;
diffe renc es in
age at time of maIT iage, and betwe en husba nds and wives
in later life;
diffe renc es in birth parit ies; and diffe rence s in the
size of hous ehold s,
in so far as they refle ct the number of child ren in
them. In turn, all
these demo graph ic diffe rence s have economic and socia
l conn otati ons, and
these prov ide an indis pensa ble framework for inter preti
ng the persi stenc e
of the high birth rates in the less devel oped regio
ns.
The pape r prese nts a brie f summary of the easil y avail
able recen t
cross -sect ion data on the demo graph ic components in
the inter natio nal
ferti lity diffe renti als, with emph asis on the comp
arison of less deve loped (LDCs) and more devel oped (DCs) regio ns among the
mark et econo mies.
This summary, and the accompanying anal ytica l comm
ents, may be fami liar·
to spec ialis ts in demography. But the inter relat ions
of these demo
graph ic aspe cts, and their poss ible conn otati ons, are
less fami liar to
econ omis ts; and the recen t addit ions of data on less
devel oped regio ns,
spars ely cove red, if at all, in earli er years (most
of Afric a and much
of Asia) make it worth while to assem ble the summary
meas ures. No
effo rt was made to go back to the origi nal censu ses
or mono graph ic
)

L
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studies; and I have relied primarily on the internation al compilation s
and special papers of the United Nations.

The aim w~ a broad survey,

on the assumption that guidance for a more intensive exploration would
be provided by such an approach.
The discussion begins with a review of the age-specifi c birth
rates for women in the successive age classes within the childbearin g
span; these, together with number of women in these age classes,
absolute and in relation to total population, are used to derive the
crude birth rates.

We can then establish the contributio n of each age

class of women to the total crude birth rate of a region.

The next

section reviews marriage proportions among women, derives age-specifi c
marital fertility ratios, and measures the contributio n to fertility
differences between the LDCs and DCs of the differences in marriage
proportions and in intra-marit al fertility.

The third section compares

the distribution s of births by age of mother, and an approximati on to
the distributio n of births by age of father, for the LDCs and the DCs.
The fourth section summarizes births by birth order or parity, indica
ting the greater weight of high parity births in the total fertility
of the LDCs and establishes the association between the incidence of
births to parents at more advanced ages and the contributio n of high
parity births to higher fertility.
devoted to statistical evidence

The fifth, and last, section

deals with the distributio n of popu

lation among households of different size, stressing the association
between higher fertility and the larger average size of household, or
higher proportions of larger households, in the LDCs than in the DCs.
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In the concluding section an attempt is made to indicate what the
findings contribute to the explanation of persisting.h igh birth rates
in the LDCs.
2.

Age Specific Birth Rates, Women
We begin with a summary of the birth rates of women in the five

year age classes in the childbearin g span from 15 through 49 years of
age (Table 1).

Since these are annual rates, an entry of 124 in line

1, column 2 means that there were 124 births per year for every 1,000
women 15-49 years old, or 620 births per 1,000 women over the five
years covered by that age class.
The regions distinguish ed are those of most interest in the
study of economic growth and levels of living.

A more detailed break

down would, of course, be desirable, but the data and resources are not
available.· In general, the regional rates are unweighted averages of
those for individual countries, the presumption being that each country,
large or small, represents an item of significant evidence.

But we

omitted countries with a population of less than a million, because of
the possibility of erratic results.

Moreover, when large countries

showed distinctive patterns (as was the case with India and Pakistan,
compared to other countries in East and Southeast Asia) we todtweighte d
·averages for them separately.

Finally, we weighted regional rates ~y

population in combining them into aggregates for all LDCs and DCs.
Total fertility is the total

of births over the childbearin g

span to 1,000 women, representat ive of the population covered in a
specific area.

Thus, the entry in line 1, column 9, indicates that
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Table 1
Annual Birth s Eer 1,000 Women! by Age of Women, Less Devel
oped
And Developed Regio ns, Early or Middl e 1960s
Number
of
Coun tries
(1)

15-19

20-24

(2)

(3)

Age of Women
25-29 30-34 35-39
(4)

(5)

(6)

40-44
(7)

Total
45-49 Ferti lity
(8)
(9)

A.

Marke t Economies
Less Devel oped Regio ns

I.

East & South east
Asia

9

124

275

280

223

154

64

la.

22

5,,.710

India -Paki stan

2

158

277

266

209

140

56

24

lb.

5,650

Other count ries

7

62

268

305

248

179

78

19

le.

5,795

Hong Kong &
Singa pore

2

48

247

315

237

148

58

8

5,305

9

113

305

352

290

199

82

17

1.

2.

Middl e East

3.

Sub- Sa1 ar an Afric a

16

183

295

268

219

153

77

32

6,135

4.

Latin Ameri ca

16

121

296

308

243

181

74

22

6,225

5.

Total , LDCs (line s
1-4, weigh ted)

131

283

289

231

161

69

23

5 ,935

II.

6.

Europ e

7.

/'

';;. 6,280

Devel oped R&gions

13

32

152

168

106

54

17

1

~

Overs eas Offsh oots

4

59

221

208

125

64

19

2

3, 490

8.

Japan

l

4

109

192

83

22

4

0

2,070

9.

Total , DCs (line s
6-8 weigh ted)

38

171

187

110

53

16

1

2, 880

III.

.550

Other Marke t Economies

10.

Europ e

4

18

121

186

147

93

36

4

3,025

11.

Latin Ameri ca

3

76

203

185

125

78

31

6

3,520

B.

Europ ean Communist Economies

12.

Devel oped

3

49

177

135

78

38

12

2

2,455

13.

Less devel oped

5

52

173

128

69

34

12

2

2,350

14.

Alban ia

1

56

275

305

256

189

· 117

58

6,280

Table 1 (conti nued)
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Notes :
Entri es in colum ns 2-8 for all count ries, excep t the four
listed below , are from
Unite d Natio ns, Interi m Repor t on Condi tions and Trend
s of Ferti lity in the World , 19601965, Popul ation Studi es, no. 52 (New York, 1972) , vario
us Annex table s. We omitt ed
count ries with popul ation below a millio n. In gener al,
we took means of the value s
for 1960 and 1965; or the value s for one of the two years
, if its base was more reliab le
or its cover age more compr ehens ive. For the Congo (Leop
oldvi lle), 1955- 57; Guine a, 1955
India , 1958~ 59; and the Philip pines , 1950- 55, data are
from Unite d Natio ns, Popul ation
Bulle tin no. 7, 1963 (New York, 1965) , Table 7.1, pp.
102-1 03.
Unles s other wise indic ated, entri es for regio ns that inclu
de more than one count ry,
are unwei ghted arithm etic means of the value s for the
sever al count ries. The weigh ts,
when used, are popul ation numbe rs for 1960 given in Unite
d Natio ns, Popul ation Estim ates
by Regio ns and Coun tries, 1950- 1960, Working paper ESA/P
/WP31, May 1970.
Line 1:

Weigh ted mean of lines la and lb, the relat ive popul ation
weigh ts (in the
total comp rising other East Asia, exclu ding North Korea
; Middl e South Asia, and South 
East Asia exclu ding North Vietn ~bein g 0.645 for line
la and 0.355 for line lb. Line
le is exclu ded.
Line la:

Weigh ted mean with weigh ts of 0.81 for India and 0.19
for Pakis tan.

Line lb:

Inclu des South Korea , Taiwa n, West Malay sia, Thail and,
Camb odia, Ceylo n,
and the Philip pines .
@
Line 2:

1

Repre sents South West Asia and North Afric a, and includ
es Turke y, Iraq,
Jorda n, Syria , Unite d Arab Repub lic, Sudan , Libya , Tunis
ia and Alger ia.
Line 3:

Inclu des Camer oon, Centr al Afric an Repu blic, Chad, Congo
, Dahomey, Ghaaa ,
Guine a, Ivory Coast , Mada gasca r, Kenya , Mali, Niger ,
Seneg al, Togo, Ugand a, and Upper Vol
Line 4:
Inclu des Mexic o, Brazi l, Colom bia, Peru, Venez uela, Ecuad
or, Guate mala,
Hond uras, Nicar agua, Domin ican Repub lic, Chile , Parag
uay, El Salva dor, Costa Rica,
Jamai ca, and Panam a.
Line 5:

Weigh ted avera ges of lines 1-4.

The weigh ts for line 1 as indic ated; for

line 2--po pulat ions of South West Asia and North Afric
a; for line 3--th e sum of
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Table 1 (continue d)

populatio ns of West, East, and Central Africa; for line 4--popula tion of Latin
America, omitting the Temperate Zone--wor k out to 63 for line 1, 9 for line 2, and
14 each for lines 3 and 4.•
Line 6:

Includes Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Netherlan ds,

France, Germany FR, Switzerla nd, Austria, Italy, England and Wales, and Scotland.
Line 7:

Includes Canada, United States, Australia , and New Zealand.

Line 9:

Weighted averages of

lines 6-8.

The weights-- the populatio n totals

for Northern and Western Europe, plus Italy (omitting the rest of Southern Europe);
and for the other regions--w ork out to 46 for Europe, 38 for overseas offshoots ,
and 16 for Japan.
Line 10:

Includes Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Line 11:

Includes Argentina , Uruguay, and Puerto Rico.

Line 12:

Includes U.S.S.R. / Czechoslo vakia,and East Germany.

Line 13:

Includes Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavi a and Bulgaria.

Excludes

Albania shown separatel y in Line 14.
Column 9:

Sum of rates for seven age classes, multiplie d by five (to allow

for the number of years in each class interval) .

Each entry shows the total number

of births over the childlear ing span to 1,000 women, aged 15-49, represent ative
of the populatio n reflected in the cross-sec tion.
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1,000 women with the fertility patterns of women in ESE Asia in the
early 1960s

bore 5,710 children through their childbearing span, an

average of 5.71 births per woman.
Several findings are suggested.

To begin with total fertility,

bir~h rates per 1,000 women of childbearing ages were,among the market
economi~s, over twice as high

in the LDCs as in the DCs.

The few

European and Latin American economies that did not clearly fit into
either of these two large groups showed fairly low total fertility,
closer to that for the DCs than to that for the LDCs.

The distinctive,

and less expected, finding was that among the European Communist
economies, excluding Albania, fertility was low, even relative to the
developed countries of Europe; and just as low, or slightly lower,
among the less developed Communist economies than among the more develop
ed.

Obviously, some aspects of the social and economic structure of

European Communist.economies restrict fertility, sharply and effectively.
Second, and more relevant to our specific topic, is the dif
ference between the LDCs and DCs in the pattern of their age specific
birth rates over the childbearing span.

For the LDCs the rates are

fairly high not only during the prime ages, from 20 through 29, and
the next higher class from 30 through 34, but also during the younger
and older ages.

Thus, if we take

an age specific birth rate of 100

(500 births in a five-year interval)to be an index of substantial
childbearing, we find that such engagement extends over five age
classes, or 25 years, in the LDCs, and only over three age classes,
or 15 years in the DCs (lines

5 and 9).
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Indeed, one could argue that it would be difficult, if not im
possibl~ to attain a total fertility as high as that found for the LDCs,
i.e. between 5,700 and 6,800, if births were limited to women 20 through
34 years old..

With fecundity proportions rising rapidly from about a

third of all women aged 17 to a peak of 93 percent at age 22, and then
declining slowly beginning at age 23 and through the early 30s, the
average proportions of fecund women are 39 percent from age 15-19, 92
per•cent for age 20-24, 90 percent for age 25-29, and 85 percent for age
30-34.

1

Given these levels, and observing

the record for individual

countries, we find that a reasonably high age s~ecific rate would average
350 for the two prime fecundity classes, i.e. 20-24 and 25-29, and about
300 for the 30-34 class--thus yielding total fertility of 5,000, without
any births to younger and older women.

But this would fall short of the

total fertility shown in lines 1-5 by between 12 and 26 percent; yet the
assumed total fertility, given an average married proportion below 90
percent (see below) would mean, for the three age classes, an average of
almost six births per married woman over the 15 years.

It is unrealistic

to assume that an average of one birth every two and a half years, over
a span of fifteen years, can be maintained for every marr.i.ed
the population.

woman in

The cumulative total for the three age clas-ses would

fall short of the 5,000 total fertility level, and the difference,
like that between 5,000 and 6,000 or more, would have to be made ur
by fairly high birth rates for younger and older women.

9

Third, if there is an element of necessity about the extended
pattern of age specific birth rates in the LDCs compared with the more
concentra ted pattern in the DCs, there is still an element of variance
or choice.

In some countries the additiona l contribut ion to high total

fertility occurs largely among women under 20; in others it occurs
among those 35 or older.

Thus in India and Pakistan Cline la), and

Sub-Sahar an Africa (line 3), the rate in the 15-19 class is over 150
per thousand, whereas in the other countries in ESE Asia (line lb), and
to a lesser extent in the Middle East (line 2), the rate for the 15-19
class is relativel y low, 62 or 113.

And, as one would expect, when the

time pattern is extended toward early ages, the specific rates at the
later ages tend to be lower than when the time pattern is not extended
back of age 20.

Thus, for India and Pakistan, and Sub-Sahar an Africa,

the rates for age 30-34 are 209 and 219 respectiv ely, compared with the
much higher rates for other countries in ESE Asia and in the Middle
East (248 and 290 respectiv ely).

Also, when the birth rates are fairly

high in the 15-19 class, the rate tends to be at the peak in the. 20-24
class, declining somewhat in the 25-29 class; where as in regions with
relativel y low rates at the early ages, the peak is reached in the 25-29
class.

The differenc es indicated between the India-Pak istan and Sub

Saharan regions, on the one hand, and the Middle East and other ESE
Asia, clearly reflect different institutio nal condition s governing age
of marriag~ particula rly of women, and suggest the diversity of age
patterns that can be associate d with a high level of total fertility . 2
Finally, it follows that the excess of fertility in the LDCs
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over that in the DCs may be accounted for by higher birth rates of the
former, partly in the young ages (below 20), partly in the prime ages
(20-34), and partly in the older ages (35 and over).

However, we are

interested in a comparison not of total fertility, but of crude birth
rates--for it is crude birth rates, in combination with crude death
rates, that yield the rate of natural increase, or natural growth of
population--wit h its effects on economic growth and structure.

We must,

therefore, shift now to the links between total fertility and crude
birth rates:

the relative size of each age class of women of child

bearing ages; and the proportion of all women of childbearing ages to
total population.

Table 2 summarizes the data on both links, shows

the res·ultant aggregate crude birth ratesJ and measures the contribu
tion to the differences in the crude birth rates made by women in
each age class within the childbearing span.
Panel A reveals that the relative magnitude of the age classes
among women in the less developed areas declines significantly as
we move from the youngest group, 15-19 years of age, to the oldest 45-49.
A simple geometric mean of the relatives of the two youngest and the
two oldest classes, for the LDCs as a whole (line 5) yields a rate of
rise from the older to the younger groups of 3.3 percent per year (we
prefer to think of it as a rise toward the younger, rather than a
decline toward the older, age groups).

This result is not surprising:

the younger groups are larger than. the older because they are members
of a larger population, i.e. are survivors of a birth cohort that,
with population growth, was larger than the one born earlier and now
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Table 2
Age Distribution of Women Within the Childbearing Span, and
Contribution to Crude Birth Rates, Less Developed and
Developed Market Economies, Early or Middle 1960s
A.

Number in Successive Age Classes as Relatives of Average Number
per Class Within Childbearing Span
15-19
(1)

20-24
(2)

Age Class of Women
25-29
30-34
35-39
(3)
(5)
(4)

40-44
(6)

Women 15-49
as% of
Total
45-49 Population
(7)
(8)

L

ESE Asia

1.45

1.31

1.19

0.98

0.82

0.68

0.57

23.1

2.

Middle East

1.47

1.32

1.17

0.99

0.80

0.67

0.57

22.5

3.

Sub-Saharan
Africa

1.53

1.32

1.13

0.96

0.81

0.68

0.56

23.4

4.

Latin America

1.53

1.30

1.11

0.97

0.82

0.69

0.57

22.8

5.

LDCs

1.48

1.31

1.17

, o. 98

0.82

0.68

0.57

23.0

6.

Europe

1.02

1.04

0.98

1.02

1.09

0.82

1.02

23.9

7.

Overseas
offshoots

1.12

0.94

0.93

1.02

1.07

0.99

0.92

23.1

8.

Japan

1.28

1.16

1.14

1.04

0.91

0.76

0.71

27.0

9.

DCs

1.10

1.03

0.99

1.02

1.05-

0.87

0.93

24.1

B.

Age Specific Birth Rates, Weighted by Size Relatives of Age Classes
Age Class of Women

Implici'.
Crude
Birth
Rate

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

Total
Fertility

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

10.

ESE Asia

180

360

333

219

126

44

13

6,375

42.1

11.

Middle East

166

403

412

287

159

55

10

7,460

47.9

12.

Sub-Saharan
Africa

280

389

303

210

124

52

18

6,880

46.0

13.

Latin America

185

385

339

236

150

51

13

6,795

44.3

14.

LDCs

194

371

338

226

132

47

13

6,605

43.4

15.

Europe

33

158

165

108

59

14

1

2,690

18.4
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Table 2 (continued)
Panel B (continued)

16.

Overseas
offshoots

17.

Japan

18.

DCs

c.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

66

208

193

128

68

19

5

126

219

86

20

42

176

185

112

56

(8)

(9)

2

3,420

22.6

3

0

2,295

17.7

14

1

2,930

20.2

Contributio ns to Crude Birth Rate, by Age of Women
Age Class of Women
15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

19.

ESE Asia

5.9

11.9

11.0

7.2

4.2

1.5

0.4

42.1

20.

Middle East

5.3

12.9

13.2

9.2

5.1

1.8

0.4

47.9

21.

Sub-Saharan
Africa

9.5

13.0

10.1

7.0

4.1

1.7

0.6

46.0

22.

Latin America

6.0

12.5

11.1

7.7

4.9

1.7

0.4

44.3

23.

LDCs

6.4

12.2

11.1

7.4

4.4

1.5

0.4

43.4

24.

Europe

1.1

5.4

5.7

3.7

2.0

0.5-

0

18.4

25.

Overseas
offshoots

2.2

6.9

6.3

4.2

2.3

0.6

0.1

22.6

26.

Japan

0.1

4.8

8.6

3.3

0.8

0.1

0

17.7

27.

DCs

1.4

6.1

6.4

3.8

1.9

0.5

0.1

20.2

Contributio n to Differences in CBR
28.
29.

Line 23 minus
line 27

5.0

6.1

4.7

3.6

2.5

1.0

0.3

23.• 2

Line 28 as %
of ·Total

22

26

20

16

11

4

1

100
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Table 2 (continued)

Notes:
Panel A:

Calculated from the 1960 population data by age and sex given in the

United Nations working paper cited in the notes to Table 1.

For line 1 we used the

sum of Other East Asia, Middle South Asia, and South East Asia: for line 2--the sum
of South West Asia and North Africa; for line 3--the sum of Western Eastern, and
Middle Africa; for line 4--the total for Latin America, minus the subtotal for the
Temperate Zone.
above.

Line 5 was derived from summation of the four regions as defined

For line 6 we used the sum for Northern, Western Europe, and Italy; for

line 7--the sum for North America and Austraiia~New Zealand.

Line 9 was derived from

summation of the three regions as defined.
Panel B:

Columns 1-7 were calculated by applying to the age-specific rates for

the regions, the LDCs, and the DCs (in table 1) the relatives shown in the
corresponding columns and lines of this table (in Panel A).

Column 8 is the sum of

rates in columns 1-7, multiplied by five (see notes to column 9 of Table 1).
Column 9 is obtained by dividing the entries in column 8 by 35 (the number of years
within the 15-49 span), and multiplying the result by the proper fraction that all
women aged 15-49 form in total population (see column 8 of P~el A).
Panel C:

The shares of the rates of each age class to the total for women

15-49, in columns 1-7 of lines 10-18 were applied to the total crude birth rate shown
for each region, for the LDCs, and for the DCs,in column 9 of Panel B.
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represented by the older classes.

Furthermore, the older groups would

have been smaller, even with the same initial birth cohort, because of
the longer cumulation of attrition by death.

And it is not difficult

to derive the 3.3 percent rate as a combination of a past population
growth rate of about 2.5 percent (within some range) and age specific
death rates over the span from 15-19 to 45-49 of say 5 per 1,000 per
year.
Since both past population growth rates, and the death rates
within the relevant span, were much lower for the DCs than for the
LDCs, one would expect a correspondingly lower rate of rise for the
former in the numbezs,moving from the older to the younger classes.
among women.

And indeed the rate derived from the geometric means of

the two classes at each end is 0.7 (see line 9).

The rate is clearly

too low, for the usual growth rates for population of the developed
regions has been well over 1 percent per year, and to this must be
added the allowance for the survival rates from ages 15 through 49.
Apparently, World War II

and the marked fluctuations of birth rates

in many developed regions over the last four to five decades have
distorted the age pattern, and, .il particular, made for somewhat larger
relative numbers among the older age groups within the childbearing
_span.

In the sense that the factors involved were transitory, the

contrast between the low implicit growth rates within the female
population of the DCs and LDCs is exaggerated, although it is in the
expected direction.
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. O?viously , the much greater numbers in the younger groups, with
their markedly higher age specific birth rates, yield a weighted total
fertility measure appreciab ly higher than the unweighte d.

When we

apply, in Panel B, the weights derived in Panel A, the weighted total
fertility measure for the LDCs is 6,606 (line 14, col. 8), compared
with the unweighte d 5,935 (in line 5, col. 9 of Table 1)--a rise of
eleven percent.

The shift for the DCs is from 2,880 in Table 1 to

2,930 in Table 2, a rise of only two percent.
The other link in shifting from the properly weighted total
fertility to the crude birth rate is the proportio n of all women of
childbear ing ages to total populatio n (Panel A, col. 8).

With higher

birth rates and rates of natural increase, and, as before, disregard ing
the possible effects of internatio nal migration , the shares of women
aged 15-49 in total populatio n might be somewhat lower for the LDCs
than for the DCs.

And, indeed, the shares are 23 and 24 percent

respectiv ely--but the differenc e is too slight to offset the dif
ferential raising effects on total fertility of the adjustmen t ·for
the size of the successiv e age classes within the childbear ing span.
With adjusted total fertility , and the share of all women
aged 15-49 in total populatio n, we can infer the crude birth rate
(Panel B, col. 9).

For the LDCs, the crude birth rate works out to

43.4 per 1,000; for the DCs to 20.2--a ratio of 2.15, compared with
a ratio of unadjuste d total fertility in Table 1 of 2.06.

The infer

red birth rates compare well with those given directly in the United
Nations sources:

for 1960-64, the weighted average for the LDCs
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is 42.8 per thousand, for the DCs 19.8--both slightly lower than
in Table 2, but with the same relative magnitudes. 3 And the regional
differentials

within the two large groups are about the same, except

that here the rate is higher for the Middle East than for Sub-Saharan
Africa, and in the United Nations estimates that for Sub-Saharan Africa
is higher.
Having the crude birth rates corresponding to the weighted age
specific rates for women, we can calculate the absolute contribution of
the births credited to a given age class of women to the aggregate crude
birth rate for a given region (Panel C).

This automatic calculation

permits us to observe the age class origin of the differences in the
crude birth rates between any two groups of countries.

For our purposes

the most interesting is the distribution of the differences in crude
birth rates between the LDCs and DCs taken as wholes (lines 28-29).
About six-tenths of the total excess of the crude birth rate
of the LDCs over those of the DCs was due to the higher age specific
birth rates in the three prime age classes--those from 20 through 34.
Over a fifth was due to the higher birth rates of the young, below
20.

About a sixth, 16 percent, was due to the higher birth rates

among the older women.

Thus the younger and older women combined

accounted for almost four-tenths of the differential in the aggreg
ate crude birth rates.

To put it differently, if the fertility of

younger and older women were the same in the LDCs and DCs, the ratio
of the total birth rate of the former to that of the latter would
have been 1.7 to 1, not almost 2.2 to 1 as shown in Table 2.
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Applications of the type just made in Table 2, and similar ones
measuring the contributions of other characteristics of mothers, fathers,
or births

to be made in the sections that follow, are obviously not

explanations.

They do not indicate the causative factors (decisions by

would-be parents, and elements underlying these decisions) that may
have been involved in producing the birth rates found.

They do, however,

narrow the locus of the results, and the measures of the different aspects
of the parents or of the births may narrow it differently.

Hopefully

then the causative factors will be more easily perceived, although room
will remain for divergent explanatory hypotheses.
3.

Married Proportions, Women
A woman, no matter what her marital status, can become a mother~

whether single, or divorced, or separated, or widowed, she can, provided
she is of childbearing age, have children if she finds a mate.

As

evi

dence, in many countries where legal marriage is prevalent, illegitimate
births are distinguished.

Conversely, a married woman, even if of

childbearing age, and not naturally sterile, does not necessarily have
children--voluntary control over intra-marital fertility having become
increasingly prevalent particularly in modern societies.

Furthermore,

in many countries, stable, non-legally certified, common law or
consensual marriages are widespread; and these have been included
here among marriages and the resulting births classified as legitimate.
The fact is that we deal here with a social institution, not a
biological process.

Consequently, we confront a diversity of meanings

18

and institutio nal framework , particula rly in internati onal compariso ns
that span a wide range of societies .

Not only is it difficult to

establish comparab ility for analytica l relevance , but the data available
are subject to greater error reflectin g biases in judgment of responden ts
in terms of preferred marital status.

Yet, the institutio n does have

meaning in the fertility process in most societies .

The latter involves

long-term union between men and women setting up families as lasting
units for the major purpose of having children and rearing them toward
independe nce and adequate status in society at their maturity.

If we

include consensua l or common law marriages as stable unions, as we
should, the proportio ns of total births that are recognize d as il
legitimat e are substanti al only in Western societies with a strict
legal marriage code and concomita nt individua l permissiv eness.

Even so,

illegitim ate births account for a moderate fraction of total births
4 Furthermo re, many illegitim ate
(ranging up to 15 percent in Sweden).
births may, in leading to a long-term , legal marriage, become legitimat e
retroacti vely, for all intents and purposes.
Marriage, as defined here, implies a long-term commitment to a
union, involves family formation , and also, in the dominant proportio n
of cases, a commi1ment to children. Therefore , despite statistic al
difficult ies and ambiguiti es, it must be considere d, and i·:s relevant
quantitat ive aspects summarize d.

Such a summary, for the marriage

proportio ns among women, by age classes, is provided in Table 3.
In general, the _proportio ns of younger women who are married
are higher in the LDCs than in the DCs.

This is particula rly true
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Table 3
Proportions of Married (Including Consensual and Polygamous
Marriages)

Women by Age Classes, Less Developed and Developed Market
Economies, 1960s
Number
of
Countries
(1)

1.

ESE Asi~weighted

la.

India-Pakistan,
weighted

lb.

Other eountries

2.

Middle East

3.

Sub-Saharan Africa

4.

Latin America

5.

Total, LDC, weighted

11

15-19

20-24

(2)

(3)

Less Developed
53.2
82.7

Age Classes
25-29 30-34 35-39

40-44

45-49

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

91.5+

90.9

87.5-

79.4

72.0

2

70.3

91.8

94.l

91.5-

87.1

77.6

69.8

9

22.1

66.0

86.8

89.8

88.l

82.6

75.9

8

34.9

78.6

89.4

91.4

89.4

84.3

77.2

14

54.4

86.8

91.4

91.4

89.3

83.8

75.0

13

17.5+

55.2

73.5

77.7

78.8

75.0

70.0

46.7

79.1

88.8

89.2

86.7

79.8

72.7

I

Developed
6.

Europe

7.

13

5.0

47.7

79.3

85.7

85.8

83.7

80.4

Overseas Offshoots

4

9.8

60.1

84.6

88.7

88.6

86.8

83.6

8.

Japan

1

1.3

31.4

79.7

88.0

87.5

84.9

79.1

9.

Total DCs, Weighted

6.2

49.8

81.4

87.2

87.0

85.1

81.4

Notes
The underlying data are from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1968, and
Demographic Yearbook, 1971, New York, 1969 and 1972 respectively.
Throughout, the share of married women, for a given age class, was to a total
excluding those whose marital status was unknown.
For the weights underlying lines 1, la, 5, and 9, see the notes to Table 1.
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Table 3--continue d
Notes--cont inued
The following countries were included, with the year of coverage indicated
in parentheses ; Line la:

India (1951), Pakistan (1961); Line lb:

Ceylon (1967),

Nepal (1961), Indonesia (1964-65, sample), Khmer (1962), Korea (1966), Taiwan (1956),
West Malaysia (1957), Philippines (1960), Thailand (1960); Line 2:

Iran (1966),

Turkey (1965), Iraq (1965), Jordan (1961), United Arab Republic (1960), Tunisia
(1966), Morocco (1960), Algeria (1966); Line 3:

Chad (African population 1963-64,

sample), Central African Republic (1959-60), Angola (1960), Dahomey (African
population, 1961), Congo (Kinshasa) (1955-57), Guinea (1955), MaLL (1960-61), Kenya
(1962), Liberia (1962), Madagascar (1966, sample), Senegal (African population
(1961), Togo (1958-60), Uganda (1963), Zambia (1969); Line 4:

Costa Rica (1963),

Brazil (1970), Guatemala (1964), Honduras (1961), Ecuador (1962), Mexico (1960),
El Salvador (1961), Panama (1960), Chile (1970), Colombia (1964), Paraguay (1962),
Peru (1961), Venezuela (1961).
For lines 6-8 the coverage is that given in Table 1.
For a few countries adjustments had to be made to estimate the proportion
for the standard age class' (when two were combined, or the lower limit of the
youngest class was different from 15 years of age).

These adjustments were

based on neighboring age classes, or on other countries in the region.

The

possible errors involved were minor, and it seemed best to include at least the
larger countries.
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of the 15-19 age class:

almost half of all women in the LDCs are mar

ried, compared with only 6 percent in the DCs.

It is also true of the

20-24 age class, in which the proportions are close to 80 percent and
about 50 percent, respectively.

Only for woman 25 or older are the

married proportions in the two groups of countries similarly high.

And,

in fact, for women 35 or older, the married proportions are larger in
the DCs than in the LDCs--largely because the incidence of widowhood
is less marked, proportionately , in the former.
In addition to this broad, and expected, finding, there are
significant differences in the proportions of married women in the
younger classes among the several regions within the less developed
group~ and a question arises about the statistical limitations of
those shown for Latin America.

The latter are far below those for

any other less developed region; and the higher level of economic develop
ment in Latin America would not explain this shortfall, since the pro
portions are lower even for the older age classes.

The possible ex

planation may be that, with the prevalence of consensual marriages in
Latin America, there is a ma~ked tendency (stronger among men, but
presumably true also of women) by some partners in consensual marriages
to report themselves as single. 5 The married proportions in the 15-19
_class are distinctly higher for India-Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa
than for the other countries in ESE Asia, Middle East, and Latin
America (the latter even allowing for some understatement ).

These

differences conform roughly to the differences in the age specific
birth rate for the 15-19 class in.Table 1--which is higher for IndiaPakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa than for the others.

Such differences
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in marriage proportions persist in the 20-24 class, although they are
much narrower than in the 1s~19 class; and they are apparently too slight
to be reflected in the age specific birth rates for the 20-24

class.

(Table 1, column 3, lines 1-4, shows no significant differences in birth
rates for this age class among the several regions.)
Since in the comparison of the LDCs with the DCs, the differentials
in marriage proportions in the younger classes among women are roughly
consonant with differences in fertility levels, we related the age
specific birth rates for age classes of all women to the married pDO
portions, deriving age specific marital fertility rates.

These are

given in Table 4, lines 1 and 2.
Obviously, we introduced an error in relating all birth5>including illegitimate)in a given age class of women
within that age class.

to the married proportions

The ratios overstate marital fertility, particular

ly in the ages in which marriage proportions are low and the ratios of all
mothers to married mothers are high.

But the exaggeration should affect

both the LDCs and the DCs, and its impact is reduced by combining the
two young classes--15-19 and 20-24--with due allowance, of course, for
the difference in size, total and married.
Because of the striking, and suspect, differences in age specific
marital fertility in the two young classes taken separately, we combine
them.

For the two combined, or up to_age 25, the age specific fertility

adjusted for the difference in married proportions is no higher among
the LDCs than among the DCs--if anything, it is significantly lower,
although some allowance must be made for differential errors in
exaggeration

(lines 1 and 2).

To put it differently, the age
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Table 4
Births per 1,000 Married Women, and Effects of Differences
in Marriage Proportions versus Differences in Births per
1,000 Married Women on Differences in Fertility Between
Less Developed and Developed Market Economies

Age Classes of Women
15-19

20..;24

15-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Total

Total Births, Eer 1,000 Married Women
1. LDCs

281

374

326

325

259

186

86

32

nc

2. DCs

613

344

374

230

126

61

19

1

nc

Effect of Differences in ProEortions of Married Women
3. Assumed identical
birth rates per
1,000 married women

350

278

193

124

53

17

nc

4. Married proportions,
LDCs (%)

61.9

88.8

89.2

86.7

79.8

72. 7

nc

Married Proportions,
DCs (%)

27.3

81.4

87.2

87.0

85.1

81.4

nc

Derived age specific
BRs, LDCs

217

247

173

108

42

12

5,080

Derived age specific
BRs, DCs

96

226

168

108

45

13

3,760

Derived BRs, LDCs,
weighted by relative
size of age class

605

289

170

88

29

7

5,940

Derived BRs, DCs, weighted
by relative size of age
class

204

221

171

113

39

12

3,800

82.5

77 .o

71

25

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

Effect of Differences in Births Eer 1,000 Married Women
10. Assumed identical marriage
proportions (%)
44.6
85.1
88.2
86.8
11. Derived age specific BRs,
LDCs

145

277

228

161

nc
5,310
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Table 4 (continued)

12. Derived age specific
BRs, DCs

167

196

111

53

16

1

3,555

13. Derived BRs, LDCs, weighted
by relative size of age
class
395

324

223

132

48

14

5,680

14. Derived BRs, DCs, weighted
by relative size of age
class

194

113

56

14

1

3,670

356

Allocation of Differences in Total Fertility Between LDCs and DCs
Aggregate
Differences

Effects of Differences in Marriage
Proportion

(1)
15.
16".

Effects of Differences in Births per
Married Woman

(2)

(3)

Total fertility not
weighted

3,055

1,320

1,755

Total fertility
weighted

3,635

2,140

2,010

nc -- not calculated
Notes:
Lines 1 and 2:

For the standard size classes obtained by dividing the age

specific birth rates in Table 1 (lines 5 and 9) by the marriage proportions (treated
as proper fractions) in Table 3 (lines 5 and 9).

For the 15-24 class (column 3),

we derived the joint age specific rate (analogous to that in Table 1) by using the
weights of the two classes (15-19, and 20-24) as given in the relevant columns and
lines of Table 2; calculated the joint marriage proportion by using the weights for
the two classes again from Table 2; and then divided the joint age specific birth
rate by the joint marriage proportion.
Line 3: Arithmetic means of the BRs in line 1 and 2.
Lines 4 and 5:

From Table 3, lines 5 and 9, with the calculation for the

joint class (15-24) as indicated above.
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.Table 4 (continued)

Lines 6 and 7:

Birth rates in line 3 multiplied by the married proportions

in lines 4 and 5 (treated as proper fractions).

Total fertility in column 9 is five

times the sum of the class fertilities (with that for 19-24 multiplied by two).
Lines 8 and 9:

The weights for the relatives of the size classes are from

Table 2, lines 5 and 9.
6 and 7.

These are applied to the derived age specific BRs in lines

Total fertility (column 9) is five times the sum of the entries in

columns 3-8.
Line 10:

Aritmetic means of the married proportions in lines 4 and 5.

Lines 11 and 12:

The BRs given in lines 1 and 2 respectively multiplied

by the assumed marriage proportions (treated as proper fractions) in line 10.
Lines 13 and 14:

The age specific birth rates, derived for the age classes

in lines 11-22, are weighted by the relative size of these classes, given in
Table 2, lines 5 and 9.
Lines 15 and 16:

Column 1: differences between total fertility of LDCs and

DCs, unweighted (from lines 5 and 9, column 9 of Table l); and weighted (from lines
14 and 18, column 8, Table 2).
and lines 8 and 9, column 9.
and 14, column 9.

Column 2: differences between lines 6 and 7, column 9;
Column 3: differences between lines 11 and 12, and 13
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specific fertility in the LDCs up to age 25 (cumulati vely) is higher
than that in the DCs only in associatio n with the much higher marriage
proportio ns, i.e. the earlier incidence of marriage among the women in
the LDCs than in the DCs.

Only in the older ages, when the marriage

proportio ns in the LDCs no longer rise, and those in the DCs catch up,
do differenc es in marriage proportio ns cease to have any effect on the
age specific fertility rates for women, or rather on

the different ials

between these rates for the LDCs and the DCs.
The finding is hardly surprisin g.

Indeed, it is, in a way, a

necessary consequen ce of the differenc e in marriage incidence at the
younger ages between the LDCs and DCs.

If in the DCs

marriage pro

portions at the early ages are low--and they were below 50 percent
through the ages of 21-23-- those women who did marry were a group with
a high propensit y toward having children.

The much wider groups of

younger married women in the LDCs would, therefore , be unlikely to
match the marital fertility rates of these rather exception al early
starters among the young women in the DCs.

It is the dominant propor

tion of married women that is the primary cause of the higher marital
fertility of the LDCs.

And yet the finding is of cardinal importanc e

in interpret ing the birth rate different ials between the LDCs and the
DCs.

To the extent that these different ials in the early ages are so

closely associate d with differenc es in marriage proportio ns, the
finding emphasize s the early entry of women into the childbear ing
family and the early withdrawa l of such women for outside activitie s.
Indeed, in many LDCs, a young woman, sheltered in her parental home,
moves immediate ly to marriage, without participa ting directly in any
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non-domestic activity through much of her youth and childbearing span.
Thus, some light is shed on the structure of the fam~ly, particularly
with regard to the ages and experiences of wife and husband.

We shall

find below that this early entry into marriage is not typical df men
in the LDCs; and that the age difference between husbands and wives is
significally wider in the LDCs than in the DCs .•
Given the age specific birth rates per 1,000 married women, and
the proportions which relate married to all women by age classes, the
differences in total fertility between the LDCs and the DCs can be
decomposed--int o those of differences due to marriage proportions (for
identical marital fertility ratios) and those due to marital fertility
(for identical marriage proportions in the comparable age classes of
women).

The calculation appears in lines 3-13 of Table 4; and the sum

mary of the two sets of effects on unweighted total fertility, or on
total fertility weighted as it was in Table 2, is shown in lines 15 and
16.

The sum of the two sets of effects does not equal the total,
particularly in line 16, because of intercorrelatio n between marriage pro
portions

and age specific marital fertility.

And there are, of

course, the limitations already noted on the use of total births in
relation to married women.

But the rough magnitude of the findings

would be little affected by refinements.

The general suggestion is

that between four-tenths and a half of the difference in total fertility
between the LDCs and DCs is due to differences in marriage proportions;
and the balance to intra-marital fertility differences.

These weights
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should be taken only as a general indication that differences in mar
riage proportions, among younger women, play a large part, if we assume
that early marriage is a pre-condition of the wide age-specific birth
rate differences in the ages below 25 and 30.

Indeed, it follows.auto

matically from the two findings already noted:

(1) that excess of birth

rates for the age group below 30, either in Table 1 or Table 2, would
account for about a half of the total fertility differentials; (2) that
up to the age between 25 and 30

the higher birth rates of women in the

LDCs are completely accounted for by their higher marriage proportions.
In this sense, the evidence in the present section is a refinement, a
detail in understanding how the much higher age specific birth rates
for the younger women in the LDCs are attained.
4.

Married Proportions, Men, and Distribution of Births by Age of Father
We are concerned here with two questions.

The first relates to

the ages of married men compared with those of their wives, for the LDCs
and the DCs.

We shall find that women who marry at an early age marry

much older men in the LDCs, and the excess of a husband's age over that
of his wife is far wider than in the DCs.

Obviously then the structure

within the family household differs in the two groups of countries,

The

decision activity of a household composed of an older husband and a younger
wife must differ from that of a household in which the ages, and implicitly
experience in the -outside world, of husband and wife do not differ as much.
The second question concerns the distribution of births by age of father.
If, in general, husbands are older relative to their wives in the LDCs
than in the DCs, and if, as already observed, childbearing continues to
older women (within their childbearing span) in the LDCs than in the
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Des, the contribution of older fathers to the crude birth rate must
be far greater in the LDCs than in the DCs.

And we shall find that a

substantial proportion of births in the LDCs can be credited to fathers
of 40 years or over.

This finding sheds further light on the deter

minants of the higher birth rates in the LDCs.
Unfortunately, the available data do not directly yield the
comparisons and distributions which we seek.

Some manipulation and

restrictive assumptions must be made before even approximate answers
can be reached.

Yet the statistical difficulties are of interest in

themselves because they reflect substantial international differences
in the marriage institutions and differences in the degree of connec
tion of children to their fathers compared with that of children to
their mothers.
We begin with the marriage proportions of men, that are to be
compared with marriage proportions of women, both for comparable age class
es.

Our intent is to derive, for comparison with the distribution of

married women aged 15-4~ a distribution of their husbands by age.
this attempt, we immediately run into difficulties.

In

In the first place,

for many less developed countries (but for none of the developed), the
reported number of married men is significantly short of the reported
number of married women.despite
married.

the inclusion of the consensually

The remaining categories are single, widowed, and separated.

Yet if reporting is accurate, if polygamy is not practiced, and if
differential international migration (in which case shortages of
husbands in some countries would be offset by excesses in others) is
disregarded, the numbers of all married men and women (albeit of dif-
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ferent ages) should be identical.
The explanation is, in good part, that polygamy is practiced in
many countries.

In fact, for several sub-Saharan countries, the United

Nations Demographic Yearbooks report numbers of men with two wives,
three wives, and so on; and for several Middle-Eastern Moslem countries
they report marriages of men already married.

The shortage of husbands

reported for Latin America, where consensual marriages are common,
suggests that some p0lygamous marriages are also included.

The alterna

tive, and contributory assumption, is that even when a consensual mar
riage is monogamous, there is a greater tendency among men than among
women not to report themselves as married.
We must match husbands and wives, for married women in their
childbearing ages, and compare the ages of husbands and wives, since
they affect decisions regarding children, and in order to derive dis
tributions of births by age of father.
marriages can be handled easily.

For this purpose only monogamous

We have, therefore, excluded from

lines 1 and 2 of Table 5 all countries in which number of married men
fell short of that of married women by more than a few percentage
points (there were no opposite pairings).

This meant eliminating all

Sub-Saharan African countries (except Madagascar, which would not
contribute much); and also many Latin American countries.
dicated,

As already in

this problem did not arise in the case of the DCs.

Although

illegitimate births and informal departures from monogamy do occur,
they are not legally recognized, nor are they recorded in any way
within the statistically established marital status categories.
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Table 5
Married Proportions, and Age Partition Values for Distributions
of Married Men and Women and of Births by Age of Mother and
Father, Less Developed and Developed Countries, 1960s

A..

Married Proportions for Men (and Women, Comparable Coverage)
Age Classes
15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

LDCs
1.

Men

11.2

40.9

69.5-

85.8

89.7

89.7

89.1

2.

Women (comparable
coverage)

42.6

75.9

87.9

88.7

86.2

79.1

73.7

DCs
3.

Men

1.1

24.6

65.2

82.5

86.6

88.0

88.2

4.

Women (comparable
coverage, Table 3)

6.2

49.8

81.4

87.2

87.0

85.1

81.4

3rd
quart.

1st
quart.

Median

3rd
quart.

B.

Partition Values for Panel A
LDCs

5.
6.

DCs

1st
quart.

Median

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Wives, 15-49,
comparable coverage

23.4

29.7

37.6

28.7

35.4 .

42.2

Corresponding married men (husbands,
see text)

28.7

36.6

46.9

31.5

38.3

45.5

-5.3

-5.7

-4.6

-2.8

-1.7

1.4

2.8

2.9

3.3

Age differentials
between LDCs & DCs

. . ..
. .. .

7.

Wives (line 5)

8.

Husbands (line 6).

9.

Age excess, husbands'
over wives (line 6 minus
line 5)
5.3

. . . . .
6.9

9.3

.
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Table 5 (continued)

C.

Partition Values, Wives and Mothers (based on Tables 2 and 3)
DCs

LDCs
Median

3rd
quart.

1st
quart.

Median

3rd
quart.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1st
quart.

10.

Wives, 15-49

23.1

29.5

37.4

28.7

35.4

42.2

11.

Mothers, 15-49

21.8

26.4

31.9

23.0

27.0

31.6

. -5.6

-5.9

-4.8

-1.2

-0.6

0.3

-5.7

-8.4

-10.6

Age differentials between
LDCs and DCs
12.

Wives (line 10)

13.

Mothers (line 11)

14.

Lead of age partition
values, mothers over
wives (line 11 minus
line 10)
-1.3
D.

-3.1

-5.5

Derivation of A~e Partition Values, Distribution of Births

hr

Age of Father
15.

16.

17.

18.

Corrected partition
values, married men
(line 10 + line 9)

28.4

36.4

46.7

31.5

38.3

45.5

Alternative partition
values, married men
(using median difference only)
30.0

36.4

44.3

31.6

38.6

45.1

Partition ages,
fathers (line 15 +
line 14)

27.1

33.3

41.2

25.8

29.9

34.9

Alternative partition
ages, fathers (line
16 plus line 14)
28.7

33.3

38.8

25.9

29.9

34.5

1.3

3.4

6.4

2.8

3.4

4.3

Age differentials between
LDCs and DCs
19.

Line 17

.

20.

Line 18

..

. .

..
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Notes:
Lines 1-2:
notes to Table 3.

The sources of data for individual countries are those cited in the
For reasons given in the text only those countries were used for

which the total numbers of married women and men for the given year differed by only
a few percent (well below 10).

The following countries were included: for ESE Asia

(10)--Ceylon, Indonesia, Khmer, S. Korea, Taiwan, India, West Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, and Thailand--with the usual weighting within the region; for the Middle
East (8)--Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and UAR; for Sub-Saharan
Africa--none; for Latin America (11)--Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.

The usual weighting by

total population in 1960 was followed in combining the three major regions covered.
Lines 3-4:

Coverage is that given in the notes to Tables 1 and 3, from the same

sources.
Line 5:

The product of the proportions married within the successive age classes,

15-49 (in lines 2 and 4 above) and the relative weight of each age class (from Table 2,
lines 5 and 9) is the distribution of married women, 15-49, by five-year age classes.
(The use of class weights for all LDCs, from Table 2, is justified because the relative
weights of the age classes in the omitted region (Sub-Saharan Africa) are quite close to
those of the LDCs as a whole (see Table 2, lines 3 and 5).

From the distributions we

derive, by linear interpolation, the three age partition values shown.
Line 6:

The ha.sic assumption here is that younger husbands are matched with

younger wives. Knowing the distribution of married men and of married women, for the
same countries and years, we can then calculate the partition age of husbands
corresponding to the partition age of wives.

The weights for age classes among men used

in the calculation were the same as those for age classes among women.

The close
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similarity of the two is shown in the distributions for large regions in the UN Working
Paper cited in the notes to Panel A of Table 2.
The underlying proportions of married women within each age class are

Line 10:

from Table 3, lines 5 and 9.

The relative weights are from Table 2, lines 5 and 9;

and the procedure is the same as that for line 5 above.
Line 7:

Table 2, lines 23 and 27 show the contribution of each age class within

the total of all women 15-49 to the crude birth rate (or to total births), for the
LDCs and DCs respectively.

From these two distributions we derive, again by linear

interpolation, the age partition values.

Since we are assuming that all births are

by married women, the distributions of births by age of mother by age of married mother
are identiaal.
Line 16:

Instead of matching the youngest husbands to the youngest wives (as

was done for line 6 above), which yields a widening excess of age of husband over age
of wife as the age of wives increases, here we assume a constant age differential
between husbands and wives and set it at the differential at the median partition
value.

An element of matching younger husbands to younger wives still remains, but

only in the sense that for all wives, 15-49, the younger group of husbands (in equal
number) is selected among the total of married men.
the age span of wives 15-49.

But there is no selectivity within
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Obviously, the exclusion of bigamous and polygamous marriages from the
LDC estimates probably means an underestima te of the excess of the age
of husbands over that of wives.

The weighted excess of a husband's

age over that of all of his several wives would presumably be greater
than the excess in monogamous pairings.

A man usually acquires his

second. or third wife as he grows older and his economic status improves.
Moreover, he usually selects much younger second and third mates.
But we have to go beyond the married proportions for men and
women separately, toward some approximati on to the relative ages of
wives and their husbands.

For this purpose the age distribution of

married men must be linked to that of married women.

No problem

would arise if data were available on the cross-class ification of
married couples by ages of husband and wife; or if data on the ages
of brides and grooms at time of marriage were available, cross-class i
fied, for an adequate sample of countries.

But neither body of data

is provided in the internation al compilation s of demographic informa
tion; and a search in the records of individual countries was not
practicable here.

Hence we attempted an approximati on by the use of

some plausible assumptions (Panel B).
The distribution s of married women, 15-49, by age class, can
be derived from marriage proportions and the data in Table 2 on the
relative size of each age class; and the quartiles and medians in
line 5 can then be estimated directly.

These estimates show that the

quartile and median ages of married women (within the childbearin g span)
in the LDCs are about five years below those in the DCs (line 7).

But

we would like a simila r set of partiti on values for the married men,
who can be viewed as husband s of the married women aged 15-·49, since
these men are the most involve d in decisio ns on the produc tion of the
next genera tion.

The corresp onding partiti on values for m2.rried men

(husban ds) in line 6 are derived on the assump tion that younge r married
men should be matched with younge r married women- -perhap s the most
plausib le of alterna tive simple assump tions.

Using the princip le in

matchin g and having the age distrib ution of married men, we assign a
number equal to that of the first quartil e of the distrib ution of
married women- -to establi sh the age partiti on value that separa tes this
number from all other, older married men; and continu e up the age scale
for married women, and corespo ndingly , married men.
Three related conclu sions emPrge.

First, wherea s married women,

age 15-49, were about five years younge r in the LDCs than in the DCs,
the husband s of these women in the LDCs were only slightl y younge r at
the median than the husband s in the DCs (less than 2 years) ; and at
the
third quartil e of the distrib ution they were distinc tly older (lines
7 and 8).

Second , the age excess of husband s over wives (the latter

aged 15-49) was much wider in the LDCs than in the DCs:

at the median

about 7 years for the former and about 3 years for the latter (line
9).
Third, the age excess of husband s over wives in the LDCs rises marked
ly
from the younge r to the older ages of wives (still within the 15-49
span)-- from 5.3 at the first quartil e to 9.3 at the third; wherea s the
age excess of husband s in the DCs increas es only slightl y--from 2.8
at the first quartil e to 3.3. at the third (line 9).
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These conclusions are subject to two qualifications: the limited
coverage of the LDCs and, particularly, the assumption underlying the
"matching" of husbands and wives.

It is this assumption, applied within

the age distribution of married women, that produces the steep rise in
exesss of age of husband for the LDCs.

On the other hand, the omission

of Sub-Saharan Africa may have resulted in understating the age excess
of husband over wife in the LDCs.
magnitudes is likely to stand.

Consequently, the general order of

To put it briefly,

the age excess of

husbands over wives is probably significantly wider in the LDCs than
in the DCs, particularly at the older age; the average ages of husbands
of wives aged 15-49 are not too different in the LDCs and the DCs; and
the wives are distinctly younger in the former than in the latter. 6
The contrast in ages of wives and husbands in the LDCs and those
in the DCs, is of interest in itself.

It suggests a difference in the

stru,cture of the household, at least as far as the parental generation
is concerned.

But it also is an indirect indication of the distribution

of births by age of father, from which we can infer the contribution of
older fathers to the difference in crude birth rates between the LDCs and
the DCs.

Panels C and D of Table 5 show the results of an attempt to

link the age distributions of married men and women with the distri
butions of births by ages of fathers and mothers.

The underlying

assumption is that births are related to married men and women, and
illegitimate births are disregarded.

However, the latter are clearly

definable, and of some limited importance, only in the DCs.
In Panel C we link the distribution of married women with that
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of married mothers (unmarried mothers having been excluded by assump
tion).

For the LDCs the distribution of married women underlying the

par~ition values shown in line 10, colunms 1-3, is from Table 2 and
3, and includes all regions--much more complete coverage than that in
li~e 5--which explains the slight difference between the two sets of
par~ition values in lines 5 and 10.

This minor discrepancy suggests

that the limitation of coverage for the LDCs in Panels A and B was
not of great consequence.

Panel C indicates, as one would expect,

that the population of current mothers is distinctly younger than the
population of current wives, aged 15-49, reflecting the higher age
specific birth rates for the younger age classes, particularly those
under 35 (line 14).

Also, since the concentration of childbearing

within the prime age classes--20-34--among the married women is greater
in the DCs than in the LDCs, and since married women are, on the
average, older in the DCs, the lead of age partition values of mothers
over wives is far wider in the DCs than in the LDCs--over 8 years
compared with 3 years at the median respectively (see line 14 again).
In Panel D we apply the differentials in the age partition
values between wives and mothers to the estimated age partition values
of husbands, to derive the age partition values for fathers.

The

assumption underlying this calculation is that the age excess of
husband over wife, for a given age class of the latter, is identical with that of father over mother within the given age class of wife.
However; if, e.g., wives age 20-24 have husbands who are 25-29 (i.e. five
years older), the current mothers among these wives (say a quarter of
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them) may have husbands who are more or less than five year~. older.
Unfortunately, we have no basis for adjusting the age differential
between husband and wife to that between father and mother.
case, the adjustment is not likely to be substantial.

In any

Moreover, the

distribution of births by age of father in lines 17 and 18 will be
checked by alternative sets of data in following tables.
Lines 17 allows for internal "matching" whereas for line 18
we assumed a constant excess of age of husband within the range of
married women 15-49--an assumption somewhat less realistic than that
used in other panels, but one that reduces the effect of the matching
assumption.

Still, the differences between the two lines are so

slight that they suggest the same conclusion.
The conclusion is that fathers of about 40 or over contribute
a quarter of all births in the LDCs.

Thus, in the latter, with the

crude birth rate at 43.4 per 1,000, a component of 10.85 is to be
credited to these fathers.

In the DCs, the age partition value for

fathers at the third quartile is below 35 years; and it seems rea
sonable in the light of other evidence

to suggest that fathers aged

40 and over can be credited with about one-tenth of all births.

With

a crude birth rate of 20.2, the contribution of the older fathers in
the DCs is then 2.02.

The difference between the contributions of

older fathers in the LDCs and DCs is then 10.85 minus 2.02, or 8.83,
out of a total difference in the crude birth rates of 23.2 points, or
well over a third.

This finding differs markedly from that for mothers.

Mothers aged 40 or more account for only 1.3 out of 23.2 points of
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total difference; and even women aged 35 and over contribute only a
seventh of the total difference in crude birth rates between LDCs and
the DCs (see Table 2, line 28).
The contribution of older fathers can be checked with an altern
ative set of data, also incomplete, but in other ways.

For eleven

less developed countries we have for recent years distributions of
births by age of father, which can be compared with the distributions
by age of mother.

Similar data are available for all developed countries,

but for the 1950s, not the 1960s; and for legitimate births only.

The

evidence is summarized in Table 6.
Regretably,

we have no data for the populous Asian countries,

like India and Pakistan, or for Sub-Saharan Africa, both regions with
high specific birth rates in the younger age classes of women.

We use

Middle East and Latin America, weighted equally (since the structure
of the former is closer to the missing regions), to represent the LDCs.
This approach, while understating the excess of ages of fathers over
those of mothers, may nevertheless yield a good approximation of the
share of older fathers in total births.
The share of fathers aged 40 and over in the distribution of
births by age of fathers for the average of ME and LA, is about a
quarter (line 11).

This finding checks with that indicated bv the

age partition values established in Table 5.

By contrast, the share

of fathers 40 or older in total births in the DCs is about 11 percent,
which also checks with the finding based on Table 5 (line 23).
In comparing directly the shares in total births of fathers
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Table 6
Distributions of Births by Age of Mother and of Father,
Selected Groups of Countries, Late 1950s and mid 1960s
(percentages)

A.

Distribution of Births
Age Classes of Mothers and Fathers
Below 20
(1)

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45 &
over

Total

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(2)

Less Developed Countries
Taiwan and Philippines
1. Mothers

5.8

26.1

29.1

20.7

12.8

4.7

0.8

100

2. Fathers

1.1

14.4

27.0

24.3

17.2

9.8

6.2

100

-4.7

-11. 7

-2.1

3.6

4.4

5.1

5.4

37.0

3. Line 2 - line 1

Middle East (3 countries)
4. Mothers

8.3

21.8

26.0

21.4

14.6

6.1

1.8

100

5. Fathers

0.4

7.1

19.0

22.5+

20.0

13.5

17.5

100

~7.9

-14.7

-7.0

1.1

5.4

7.4

15.7

59.2

6. Line 5 - line 4

Latin America (6 countries)
7. Mothers

14 .3

29.4

24.2

16.6

11.0

3.7

0.8

100

8. Fathers

2.3

18.6

24.6

21.0

15.0

9.3

9.2

100

-12.0

-10.8

0.4

4.4

4.0

5.6

8.4

45.6

9. Line 8 - line 7
10.

Average of ME and LA (equal weights)

10. Mothers

11.3

25.6

25.1

19.0

12.8

4.9

1.3

100

11. Fathers

1.3

12.9

21.8

21.8

17.5

11.4

13.3

100

-10.0

-12.7

-3.3

2.8

4.7

6.5

12.0

52.0

12. Line 11-line 10
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Developed Countries
Europe (10 countries)
13. Mothers

4.9

26.3

31.3

21.9

11.7

3.5

0.4

100

14. Fathers

0.7

13.8

30.7

26.2

15.9

7.8

4.9

100

-4.2

-12.5

-0.6

4.3

4.2

4.3

4.5

34.6

15. Line 14-line 13

Overseas Offshoots (3 countries)
16. Mothers

8.9

31.5

29.4

17.8

9.4

2.8

0.2

100

17. Fathers

1.6

18.3

30.5

24.3

14.7

6.9

3.7

100

-7.3

-13.2

1.1

6.5

5.3

4.1

3.5

41.0

19. Mothers

1.2

27.2

43.3

20.2

6.6

1.4

0.1

100

20. Fathers

0

7.5

39.4

33.1

12.4

5.1

2.5

100

-19.7

-3.9

12.9

5.8

3.7

2.4

49.6

18. Line 17-line 16
JaEan

21. Line 20-line 19

-1.2

All DeveloEed (weighted average)
22. Mothers

5.8

28.4

32.5

20.1

10.0

2.9

0.3

100

23. Fathers

0.9

14.5+

32.0

26.6

14.9

7.0

4.1

100

-0.5

6.5

4.9

4.1

3.8

38.6

24. Line 23-line 22
B.

-4.9

-13. 9

Age Partition Values in the Distributio n of Births, Mothers and Fathers
Taiwan
Philip.

Middle
East

Latin
Am.

LA &
ME

Europe

Ov.
Off.

Japan

DCs

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1)

(2)

(3)

25. 1st quartile

23.7

23.8

21.8

22.7

23.8

22.6

24.3

23.4

26. Median

28.1

28.8

26.3

27.6

28.0

26.6

27.5

27.4

27. 3rd quartile

33.4

34.4

32.1

33.4

32.9

31.5

30.8

32.1

Mothers
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

28. 1st quartile

26.6

29.6

25.8

27.5

26.7

25.8

27.2

26.5

29. Median

31.5

35.2

31.1

33.2

30.9

29.9

30.5

30.5

30. 3rd quartile

37.4

42.2

37.8

39.9

36.1

35.1

34.2

35.3

Fathers

Excess of Age of Fathers·
31. 1st quartile

2.9

5.8

4.0

4.8

2.9

3.2

2.9

3.1

32. Median

3.4

6.45

4.8

5.6

2.9

3.3

3.0

3.1

33. 3rd quartile

4.0

7.8

5.7

6.5

3.2

3.6

3.4

3.2

Notes:
The distributions of births by age of mothers and of fathers are for identical
countries for the same year.

Column 8 of lines 3, 6, 9 •.• 24, is the sum of

columns 1-7, signs disregarded.
The data for the LDCs are largely from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook,
1969 (New York, 1970), Tables 14 and 19.

Taiwan is the one country for an earlier

year, 1958, from Demographic Yearbook, 1959 (New York, 1959), Tables 11 and 13.
Lines 1-2:

Includes the Philippines (1964) and Taiwan (1958).

Lines 4-5:

Includes Algeria (1965), Tunisia (1965), and the United Arab

Republic (1966).
Lines 7-8:

Includes Puerto Rico (1963), Peru (1963), Chile (1963), Guatemala

(1963), and Costa Rica and Panama, combined (1963).

Many Latin American countries

also reporting had to be omitted because in the distribution by age of father, the
unallocated births were more than twenty percent of the total.
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Lines 13-14: Because of inadequate coverage of Europe in later years, we
had to use data on legitimate births for 1957 or 1958, given in the Demographic
Yearbook, 1959.

The only country included for a recent year (total births, 1963)

was England and Wales.
The following countries were included: Austria (1958), Belgium (1958), Denmark

(1957), Finland (1958), France (1958), Germany (FR, 1955), ~etherlands (1958),
Norway (1957), Sweden (1957) and England and Wales (1963).
Lines 16-17:

Includes Canada (1958), United States (1955), and Australia (1963).

Lines 19-20:

For 1957.

Lines 22-23:

The weights used are population for 1960 (see notes to· Table 1).

Lines 25-30: Derived by linear interpolation from the percentage distributions
in Panel>..
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and mothers of identical age classes (lines 3,6, and so on of Panel A),
or in comparing the age partition values derived from the distributions
of births by ages of fathers and mothers, we are implicitly matching
younger fathers and mothers.

Since this plausible assumption is used

also in connection with Table 5, we can compare the differentials in
age-partition values between mothers and fathers, with those obtained
in comparing wives and husbands in Table 5.

There the age excess of

husbands over wives, for the LDCs, was 5.3 years at the first quartile,
6.9 years at the median, and 9.3 years at the third quartile; for the
DCs it was 2.8, 2.9, 3.3 years respectively (see Table 5, line 9).

In

Table 6, the age excess of fathers over mothers, for the average of the
Middle East and Latin America, was 4.8 years at the first quartile,
5.6 years at the median, and 6.5 years at the third quartile; while
the corresponding differentials for the DCs are 3.1, 3.1, 3.2 years
(lines 31-33, columns 4 and 8).

For the DCs the differentials between

the age partition values of husbands and wives are about the same as
between those of fathers and mothers, although the average ages of
wives and husbands differ from those of mothers and fathers.

For the

LDCs the age excess of fathers over mothers in Table 6 is narrower
than that of husbands over wives in Table 5, but the difference maybe
due partially' to inadequate coverage in Table 5.

Yet Table 6 confirms,

for fathers and mothers, the finding for husbands and wives in Table
5:

the age excess of men is much wider in the LDCs than in the DCs,

and it increases more significantly in the former as the age of wife
or mother rises.
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On the basis of Table 6, and the assumption that the average

for the Middle East and Latin American represents the LDCs, we derive
the distributions of births by the quinquennial age classes of fathers,
as we did for mothers in Table 2.

We then calculate the contributions

of each age class to the differences in crude birth rates between the
LDCs and DCs (Table 7).
The finding here confirms the inference from Table 5 that the
contribution of fathers aged 40 and over is so much greater in the
LDCs than in the DCs that it accounts for one-third of the total dif
ferences between the crude birth rates of the two groups of countries.
In Table 2 we found that young mothers, those below the age of 20,
contributed more than a fifth of the total difference between the crude
birth rates of the LDCs and the DCs (see Table 2, line 29).

Assuming

little overlapping between husbands 40 and over and wives below the
age of 20, one could say that if the age specific birth rates for women
below age 20 and for men 40 or more were the same in the LDCs and the
DCs, the difference in the crude birth rates between the two groups of
countries would have been cut by more than half; and the crude birth
rate for the LDCs would be somewhat over 30 per 1,000 (compared with
about 20 for the DCs), instead of over 43 per 1,000 as shown now.
5.

Distribution of Births by Parity
Parity refers to the birth order in the childbearing sequence

for a given mother--first birth, second, third, and so on.

It suggests

the number of children presumed to be living when the given birth
occurs--althoug h this statistics could be estimated directly if data
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Table 7
Distribution of Births by Age of Father, Less Developed
and Developed Market Economies, 1950s and 1960s

Age of Mother or Father
20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45 &
over

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1. Middle East

11.1

27.0

27.6

19.2

10.7

3.7

0.7

100

2. Latin America

13.6

28.3

25.0

17.4

11.0

3.8

1.0

100

3. ME and LA
(equal weights)

12.4

27.6

26.3

18.3

10.8

3.7

0.9

100

4. LDCs

14.6

28.1

25.6

17.1

10.0

3.6

1.0

100

5. Differences in %
shares of births,
age of father minus
age of mother,
ME and LA

-10.0

-12.7

-3.3

2.8

4.7

6.5

i2.0

0

Derived% shares of
births by age of
father (line 4 +
line 5)

4.6

15.4

22.3

19.9

14.7

10.1

13.0

100

7. % shares of births
by age of mother, DCs

7.2

30.0

31.6

19.1

9.5

2.4

0.2

100

8. Differences in%
shares of births,
age of father minus
age of mother, DCs

-4.9

-13. 9

-0.5

6.5

4.9

4.1

3.9

0

9. Derived% shares of
births by age of
father, DCs (line 7
plus line 8)

2.3

16.1

31.1

25.6

14.4

6.5

4.0

100

Below
20

% Shares of
Births by Age
of Mother (lines 1-4)

6.
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Age Classes
Below
20

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45+

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Contribut ions to Differenc es in Crude Birth Rates, Age Classes of Fathers
10.

LDCs

2.0

6.7

9.7

8.6

6.4

4.4

5.6

43.4

11.

DCs

0.5

3.2

6.3

5.2

2.9

1.3

0.8

20.2

12.

Contribut ions
to differenc es

1.5

3.5

3.4

3.4

3.5

3.1

4.8

23.2

7

15

15

15

15

13

20

100

13.

% Distribut ion

c£. Line 12

Notes:
Lines 1, 2, and 4:

Calculate d from Table 2, lines 11, 13, and 14.

Line 5:

From Table 5, line 12.

Line 7:

From Table 2, line 18.

Line 8:

From Table 5, line 24.

Lines 10-13:

Shares in lines 6 and 9 applied

to total crude birth rates

for the LDCs (43.4 per 1,000) and the DCs (20.2).

See also Table 2, Panel C.
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were available on numbers of surviving children cross-classified with
the occurrence of the next birth.

Parity data also shed some light on

the age of parents, sin~e, obviou5ly, high parities, i.e. high orders
of birth, are connected with advanced ages of mother and, part~cularly,
of father.

The two connections--between parity and older siblings,

and between parity and age of parents--set the lines for the discus
sion here of the summary data.
In Table 8 we show the distribution of births by birth order
for the LDCs and the DCs.

The coverage for the LDCs omits Sub-Saharan

Africa for which the data are not available,and is quite limited for
other regions.

But for the three subregions shown, the distributions

are quite similar:

the share of the high parity births (i.e. the fifth

and higher order) is 37 percent of ESE Asia, 33 percent for the Middle
East, and 35 percent for Latin America.
iation among the developed countries:

There is somewhat greater var
the share of the s~ne high parities

is less than 10 percent for Europe, only 2 percent for Japan, and 16
percent for the overseas countries.

But each of these, and their

average, about 11 percent, are distinctly below the shares of high
parities for the LDCs.

This finding is not surprising since we found

in Table l that complete fertility averaged about 6 children for the
LDCs and less than 3 children for the DCs--and thus clearly implied
much greater proportions of births of high parities in the LDCs than
in the·DCs.
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Table 8
Distribution of Births by Birth Order, Less Developed
and Developed Market Economies, Early 1960s

Number
of
Countries

1

2

3

4

5

6&7

8+

Total

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Shares of Births in Increasing Order {Parity2

Less Developed
1.

ESE Asia

4

18.4

16.9

14.9

13.0

10.9

14.9

11.0

100

2.

Middle East

2

17.2

19.7

16.1

13.9

11.0

14.0

8.1

100

3.

Latin America

12

21.6

16.7

14.5

12.0

9.6

13.2

12.4

100

4.

Total LDCs,
weighted

18.8

17.1

15.0

12.9

10.7

14.6

10.9

100

13

36.5

29.4

16.4

8.3

4.2

3.5

1. 7

100

Developed
5.

Europe

6.

Overseas offshoots

4

28.9

24.8

18.5-

11.7

6.6

6.0

3.5

100

7.

Japan

1

47.5

35.7

11.8

3.0

1.1

0.7

0.2

100

8.

Total DCs,
weighted

35.4

28. 7

16.5-

8.7

4.6

4.0

2.1

100

8.2

7.4

6.5

5.6

4.7

6.3

4.7

43.4

10. DCs

7.2

5.8

3.3

1.7

0.9

0.9

0.4

20.2

11. Line 9 minus
line 10

1.0

1.6

3.2

3.9

3.8

5.4

4.3

23.2

4

7

14

17

16

23

19

100

Contributions to Crude Birth Rates
9.

LDCs

12. !IDistribution of
line 11
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Table 8 continued:

Notes:
Lines 1-3 and 5-7:

The underlying data are from United Nations, Demographic

Yearbook, 1969 (New York 1970), Table 17, supplemente d for one or two countries by
the Demographic Yearbook, 1965 (New York 1966), Table 16.
The data refer primarily to 1963, but another year was taken if data for 1963
were missing or their coverage was incomplete.

No adequate data were available for

Sub-Saharan Africa.
Percentages were taken to totals excluding the unallocated , except for Mexico
where the uµallocated were combined in the source with the top parity group (but the
effect on column 8 is negligible) .

For Sweden,the shares of the two top parity groups

had to be estimated from the averages for the other twelve countries in the region.
Line 1:

Includes Pakistan, West Malaysia, Philippines , and Thailand.

The data

for India, relating to a limited sample of urban communities , could not be used~ there
fore, we took an unweighted mean of entries for the four countries.
Line 2:
Line 3:

Includes Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.
Includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica,

Mexico, Panama, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
Lines 4 and 8:
Lines 5-6:
Lines 9-10:

The weighting was the same as that in Tables 1 and 2.

The coverage is the same as that in Table 1.
The percentage shares in lines 4 and 8 were applied to the crude

birth rates for the LDCs and DCs (43.4 and 20.2 respectivel y, see Table 2).
Lines 11-12:

Calculated similarly to lines 28-29 of Table 2.
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Nor is it surprising that the high parity births account for
much of the excess of the crude birth rate in the LDCs over that in
the DCs.

Births of the fifth and higher orders contribute c)_ose to

six-tenths of the total difference in the crude birth rates between
the LDCs and the DCs (line 12).

Thus, if the proportions of high

parity births to total population were the same for the LDCs as for
the DCs the crude birth rates would differ by only four-tenths, i.e.
would be somewhat below 30 per 1,000 in the LDG>, instead of the 43. 4
per 1,000 for the late 1960s.
But we are more concerned here with the connection between
births of high parity and the presumed number of older surviving
siblings.

For the latter we require data on mortality for the younger

ages, which are even scarcer for the LDCs than those on births by parity.
But we can approximate the necessary coefficients for Latin America,
the only subregion among the LDCs for which the coverage in Table 8 is
adequate.
Estimates of survival of children to age 5 are available for a
7
.
. Am.
erican countries.
number ofLatin

For 1955-59 (the latest quinquen-

nium shown), the number of survivors at age 5 (from an initial cohort
of 1,000) varies from a high of 929 for Argentina to a low of 787 for
Guatemala.

The arithmetic mean number of survivors for 11 countries

(excluding Argentina, but comprising Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela) is 849.
from 10 to 20.

But we also need estimates of survivors to ages

We know from the standard sources that age specific
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death rates between age 5 and the late teens are extremely low.

We

have, therefore, assumed relevant survivor estimate to high parity ages
of 800 to 825 for Latin America or a cumulative mortality of 175 to 200
per 1,000.

For the DCs we have assumed 925 to 940 survivors, or a

cumulative mortality of 60 to 75 per 1,000 (a

sizable error in this

estimate will have little effect on our comparison) .
The comparison of the birth parity grouping for Latin America,
with that for·a11 the DCs is given in the following tabulation.
Contributio n to CBR,
Low Parities (1-4)
Total Survival Adjrate
usted
(1)
(2)
(1+2)
(3)
28.7
0.825
23.68

l.

Latin America

2.

DCs

18.0

3.

Excess,
LA over DCS

10.7

Note:

0.940

Contributio n to CBR
High Parities, 5+
Total Survival Adjrate
usted
(4)
(4+5)
(5)
(6)
0.80
15.6
12.48

16.92

2.2

6.76

13.4

0.925

2.04
10.44

The contributio n for Latin America was calculated by multiplying

the shares of parity groups in total births (line 3, Table 8) by the
total crude birth rate of 44.3 per 1,000 (for the latter see Table 2,
line 13).
The rough comparison shows that by the time the average mother
in Latin America gives birth to her fifth child, she must have over
three surviving children.

Moreover, the contributio n even of mothers

with birth parity below 5, in terms of surviving children, 23.7 per
1,000, exceeds not only the total surviving birth rate (18.96) but
also the total crude birth rate (20.2) for the DCs.

Yet the con-
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tributions to the crude birth rate in Latin America continued beyond
the fourth birth order--with the survivors of these high bi1'ths exceed
ing those in the DCs by over 10 points and accounting for about six
tenths of the total difference in the proportion of surviving births (to
about age 20) between Latin America and the DCs.

In short, in the LDCs,

the high fertility and high birth parities persist despite the substantial
number of surviving children within the families that continue to grow.
The mortality rates may be somewhat higher in the other LDC regions
than in Latin America, but the conclusion is likely to stand.
We turn now to the connection between high parities and the
advanced age of parents.

The relevant data provide cross-classifications

of births by parity and age of mother alone, and for only a few countries,
particularly among the less developed.

Hence we present the data for a

few individual countries, and do not attempt to derive meaningful
averages (Table 9)°.

However, the general order of magnitudes suggested

would probably be confirmed by more abundant data if they were available.
Needless to say, the role of the older mothers in high parity
births in substantial.

Thus the average for the five selected less

developed countries shows that of 31.5 percent, the share of high
parity births in the total, over four-tenths was contributed by mothers
35 years of age or older.

Interestingly, in the DCs also, the contri

bution of mothers that old to the high parity births was also about
fo~r-tenths, although the latter accounted for only about 10 percent
of total births.

Given the excess in the age of father over mother,

discussed in the preceding section, we may assume that mothers 35
years old or more are to be matched with fathers well over 40; and
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Table 9
Shares in Total Births of High Parity Births to Older Mothers,
Selected LDCs and DCs; and Contribution to Differences
in Birth Rates, Selected Countries
A.

Shares in Total Births of High Parity
Births (5th and over) to Older Mothers (%)
Age of Mothers
30-34

35-39

(1)

(2)

40 and over
(3)

30 and over

All ages

(4)

(5)

Less Developed
Philippines
1963

10. 7

9.0

3. 7

23.4

35.4

Thailand
1964

11.0

10. 3

5. 5

21. 8

32. 9

3.

UAR, 1966

7. 2

9.4

5. 7

22. 3

25. 9

4.

Guatemala
1963

10.3

8. 5

3. 8

22. 6

33. 1

11. 0

9. 6

3. 9

24.5

30. 3

10.0

9. 4

4. 5

23.9

31. 5

1.
2.

5.
6.

Colombia
1964
Average
Lines 1-5

Developed
7.

France, 1963

7. 0

4. 4

1.9

13. 3

14. 2

8.

Germany, FR.
1964

2. 3

2. 1

1. 1

5. 5

6. 6

USA, 1964

5. 7

4. 0

1.3

11. 0

17. 4

10.

Japan, 1963

o. 7

o. 8

o. 3

1.8

2. 4

11.

Average
Lines 7-10

3. 9

2. 8

1. 2

7. 9

10.15

9.
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Table 9 continued:

Bo

Contribution to Differences in Birth Rates
Shares of High
Parity Births (%)

Contributions to
CBR

Mothers,
Aged 30+
(1)

Mothers,
Aged 30+
(3)

Mothers,
Aged 35+
(2)

Mothers,
Aged 35+
(4)

12.

LDCs

25. 7

15. 9

11. 2

6.90

13.

DCs

8. 2

4. 2

1. 7

0.85-

Notes
Panel A:

The data are from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1969,

(New York, 1970), Table 17.

We chose the major countries in the regions for

which data were available, to secure a rough approximation.

Because of the

limited coverage of the less developed regions, other than Latin America, even
inclusion of all reporting countries could not yield adequate representation.
Panel B, columns 1 and 2:

First we derived the ratios of the shares of

high parity births for the older mothers to the shares of high parity births for
mothers of all ages (i.e. the ratio of column 4 to column 5, in lines 6 and 10
for column 1 or of the sums of columns 2 and 3 to column 5 in lines 6 and 10,
for column 2). These worked out too. 71 and 0.44 for the LDCs and O. 77 and 0.39
for the DCs.

We then applied these to the total shares of higher parities in

Table 7 (i.e. 36.2 percent for LDCs and 10. 7 percent for the DCs), to secure
the entries in lines 12 and 13.
Panel B, columns 3 and 4:

The shares in column 1-2 were multiplied by

the total CBR for the LDCs (43.4) and for the DCs (20.2) respectively.

The
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Table 9 continued:

calculation thus parallels that in Panel C of Table 2, except that here it is
limited to a comparison of higher parity births to older mothers, not to all
births to all mothers.
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mothers 30 years old or more imply fathers 35 or more.
Panel B of Table 9 provides an illustrati ve calculatio n of the
contribut ion of high parity births to older parents to the total dif
ferential (23.2 points) in the crude birth rates between the LDes and
Des.

The high parity births to mothers aged 35 or more (and implicit

ly to fathers well over 40) account for over 6 points, or over a
quarter of the total differenc e in the eBRs between the LDCs and the
Des.

The high parity births to mothers aged 30 and over (and implicit

ly to fathers 35 and older) account for 9.5 points, or almost half of
the different ial in the crude birth rates.
We have emprasized the large contribut ion of high parities,
associate d with sizable numbers of surviving siblings and with the
advanced age of parents, to the excess of crude birth rates in the
LDes over the Des.

The reason for this is that these findings must hP

recognize d in dealing with the persisten ce of the high birth rates in the LDCs,
We must, in analysing the latter, explain not only the connectio n between the
higher fertility and the earlier marriage and younger parents; i.e.
at the low parities, but also the relation of high parities to older
parents.

Why does a family with a mother whose fecundity is declining ,

and with the father who approache s or passes beyond the age of forty,
continue to have high parity births?

Why do such families contribut e

between a quarter and a half of the total birth rate different ial
between the LDes and the DCs?
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6.

Distribution by Size of Household
The family, a group related by blood-ties and usually residing

together, is the unit in society primarily responsible for rearing
children to the age of maturity, when they can leave the p,3.rental
home and assume the responsibilities of adult life.

Given the higher

fertility, predominantly intra-marital, in the LDCs, the average
family should be larger in these countries than in the DCs, if only
because more surviving children are brought up within the family fold.
But the family is a complex concept that does not lend itself
easily to statistical observation; in the larger meaning, relevant to
pooling of economic assets and income for coverage of consumer ex
penditures and accumulation, a family should include not only the
nuclear unit of parents and their children residing together but also
others.

The available statistics do not

refer to the family but to

the household--a group of individuals sharing quarters (including
single-person households) "who make common provision for food and
other essentials of living.

The persons in the group may pool their

incomes and have a common budget to a greater or lesser extent; they
may be related or unrelated persons, or a combination of both. "

8

A

household can then be wider than a family, since it may include
members not related by blood-ties, or narrower since it may exclude
closely related members living elsewhere.

Still, it is a fairly

useful approximation to what may be called the co-habiting family
unit, in that households

with members not related by blood-ties

(e.g. domestic servants, hired workers for a family business, boarders,
and the like) constitute limited proportions of all households.
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Being largely family households, they are relevant to tracing the
effects of differential fertility on the number of children within
the unit.

More important for our purpose--consideration of the

possible effects of numbers of children on the economic position of
the closely relevant family unit--the household is the unit most often
employed in studies of the distribution of income by size.
Table 10 summarizes the data on distribution of ,households and
population by size of household, with emphasis on comparison between
the LDCs and DCs.

The difficulties with the definition of a house

hold, particularly in cases of unrelated individuals living communally
in lodging houses, dormitories, and the like--in addition to those
.involved in establishing fully the sharing of quarters by a family
household with non-related members--yield statistical divergences
from the true situation (illustrations can be found in the source in
footnote 8).

In Table 10 these difficulties appear to affect parti

cularly the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa, which suffers also from
inadequate country coverage.

For these reasons, we excluded.Sub

Saharan Africa from the averages for all LDCs--although the broad
differences between the LDCs and the DCs would not have been much
affected by its inclusion.
The larger size of household, and particularly the larger
proportion of households and population in the larger units in the
LDCs than in the DCs,is clear.

Households of seven persons or more

are 28 percent of all households in the LDCs (line 5) and they
account for close to a half of total population (line 14), whereas
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Distribution of Households and Population

Table 10

by Size of Household, LDCs and DCs,
Early and Late 1960s (percentages)

Groups

Size of Household
1
(1)

1.

ESE Asia
(8)

2.

Middle East
(9)
Sub~aharan Afr.
(8)

4.
5.

3-4
(3)

5-6
(4)

7-8
(5)

9+
(6)

Distribution of Households

A.

3.

2
(2)

5.7

8.8

29.7

28.2

17.8

9.8

6.0

10.8

28.6

29.3

15.7

9.6
20.4

20.1

48.1

11.4

Latin America
(15)

7.4

10.5

27.1

24.9

16.5

13.6

LDCs (ex. line
3)

6.0

9.3

29.1

27.8

17.4

10.4

6.

Europe (13)

16.9

26.1

37.9

14.5

4.6

7.

Overseas offshoots
(4)
10.9

24.7

37.1

19.8

7.5

.8.

Japan (1970)

13.1

15.0

44.0

22.3

5.6

9.

DCs

14.0

23.8

38.6

17.8

5.8

Distribution of Population (Same Countries as in Panel A)

B.
10. ESE Asia

1.1

3.6

20.6

29.7

25.6

19.4

11. Middle East

1.2

4.2

19.7

31.4

23.9

19.6

12. Sub-Saharan Afr.

2.7

41.4

24.2

31. 7
1.5

4.1

19.0

26.0

23.0

26.4

14. LDCs (ex. line 12) 1.2

3.7

20.3

29.3

25.0

20.5

13. Latin America

15.

Eurppe

5.4

16.8

41.9

24.4

11.5

16.

Overseas offshoots 3.1

13.9

36.5

29.7

16.8

17.

Japan

3.6

8.3

43.4

33.1

11.6

18.

DCs

4.2

14.3

40.1

27.8

13.6
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Table 10--conti nued
Notes:
The major source is the United Nations, Methods of Projectin g House
holds and Families, Manual VIII in the series of annuals on methods of es
timating populatio n (New York, 1973), Table 3, pp. 12-15, which distingui shes
the following size classes of household s:

1, 2-4, 5-6, 7 and over.

To

obtain greater detail, we used data from somewhat fewer countries for each
region (except Sub-Sahar an Africa) taken from the Demograph ic Yearbooks
(particul arly those for 1962 and 1963, and 1971), from these we derived al
location ratios for the 2-4 and 7+ groups; and applied them to the total
shares for these two size groups.
Lines 1 and 8:

Include Cambodia, Ceylon, South Korea, Federatio n of

Malaya, Philippin es, Thailand, India (allocate d with the wider size groups
by ratios for Ceylon), and Pakistan.

The usual weighting was employed for

this region.
Lines 2 and 9:

Include Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Libya,

Tunisia, Morocco, and the UAR.
Lines 3 and 10: · Include several smaller countries for better coverage:
Lesotho, Dahomey, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zambia.
Cameroon was excluded because of the exception al showing for the 1-person
group.
Lines 4 and 11:

Include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,

Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua , Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela .
Lines 6-8 and 15-17:

Coverage is as complete as in Table 1.

We took the

1970 data for Japan (rather than those for earlier years) to give greater weight
to the recent experienc e (with the rapid changes in Japan's birth rate and
family structure ).
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the corresponding proportions in the DCs are less than 6 and less than
14 percent respectively (lines 9 and 18).

By contrast, one person

households in the LDCs are only 6 percent of the total and they account
for about 1 percent of total population, while the corresponding pro
portions for the DCs are 14 and 4 percent respectively.
The arithmetic mean size of household is clearly greater in the
LDCs than in

the DCs.

This mean is easily calculated by dividing the

percentage shares of one person households in the total of households
by the share of one-person households in total population (or,
with the necessary adjustment, by relating the proportions of two
person households in households and in population).

The resultant

averages are 5.0 persons per household in the LDCs and 3.33 persons
per household in the DCs.

This difference, while substantial, may

appear to be too narrow, considering that total fertility in the LDCs
is over twice as high as that in the DCs (see Table 1).

However, the

average size of household is a weighted arithmetic mean, in which the
younger (and smaller) households have a greater weight in the LDCs
than in the DCs (see Table 2 for relative weights of women in the suc
cessive age groups within the childbearing span).
.weights in Table 2 for women aged 15 to 49 and

If we use the

assume that the size

of household corresponding to these ages, grows in the LDCs from 3
for the 15-19 age group of women

by one person for each successive

quninquennium reaching 9 persons in the age group 45-49, the weighted
avBrage size of household works out to somewhat over 5.5.

The addition

of single-person households (6 percent of households, but only 1,2
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percent of population) would reduce the arithmetic mean to 5.3; and
if we reasonably assume that households with women aged 50 years and
over are, on the whole, smaller, the avergge of 5.0 obtained from
Table 10 is consistent with the assumption that during the childbearing
cycle

the average woman in the LDCs may have over 7 births (accounting

for the top size of 9 persons).

A similar calculation for the DCs,

using a progression in size of household from 2 persons for women
15-19 years old, to 3 for the 20-24 age bracket, to 4 for the 25-29
age bracket, and to 4.5 for the remaining age brackets through 45-49,
would yield a weighted arithmetic mean of 3.8, which with inclusion of
one person households (14 percent of households and 4.2 percent of
population), would be reduced to 3.4--and be consistent with the 3.33
mean derived from Table 10, with allowance for the remaining house
holds with women aged 50 years and over.

The consistency then is

with the assumption that women in the DCs bear 2.5 children (or
somewhat more)--less than half of the number assumed in the calcula
tion for the LDCs.
The interest in the conjectural calculations just presented is
less in the consistency between the difference in mean size of house
holds in the LDCs and the DCs and the difference in their fertility,
than in the emphasis on the fact that the range in the size of households
within each group of countries is a reflection of the stages in the
life cycle of a family.

A new family begins with two members, grows

as children are born and have to be maintained within the family for
a prolonged period to maturity; then contracts as the parents and
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children grow older and the children leave to form a new and separate
household.

The average size of the household is a somewhat artifical

measure that is a weighted combination of units of widely divergent
magnitudes.

It must therefore be remembered that differences in size

of household reflect, in large part, differences in the stage in the
life cycle of growth and contraction of the various family units.
Two further observations are relevant to the findings in Table
10.

J

First, it can be demonstrated that much of the difference between

the 5.0 person average household in the LDCs and the 3.33 person
average household in the DCs is due to the different proportions of
children in total population.

In 1960 in the LDCs (excluding Sub

Saharan Af~ica) the proportion of children under 15 to total population was 42.8 percent; of persons under 20 years of age--52.5 percent. 9
The similar proportions for the DCs (Western and Northern Europe and
Italy, North America, Australia and New Zealand and Japan) were 27.8
and 33.3 percent respectively.

If we apply these percentages to the

mean size of household we find that of the total discrepancy of 1.67
persons, children under 15 accounted for 1.22 persons (or over three
quarters of the difference) and those under 20 years of age accounted
for 1.44 persons (or 86 percent of the difference).

The calculation

implies, realistically, that few children under 15 or persons under
20 live outside the family unit.
The second observation involves data relating size of household
and income per person; and is associated with the finding (still to
be tested) that if we group households by size, and then divide house-
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hold income by number of person s, per person income declin es
fairly
consis tently as we move up the scale in size of househ old. 10

If this

negati ve assoc iation , howev er mitiga ted by reduct ion of nu:nbe
r of
person s to equiva lent consuming units, is accept ed, the signif
icantl y
wider range in size of househ olds in the LDCs than in the DCs
is of
furthe r intere st.

Thus if we assume that the smalle r the househ old,

the highe r the per person income , and array popula tion in descen
ding order
of per person income , using the data in Table 10 for all LDCs
and DCs,
we can interp olate the shares of the top 20 and lowest 50 percen
t of
popul ation.

We find that the averag e size of househ olds for these

two partit ion groups are 2.17 and 7.90 in the LDCs, and 1.70
and 5.38
for the DCs--t he ratios being 3.64 and 3.15, respec tively .
if the relati on betwee n per

Again ,

person income and size of househ old

is negati ve, the figure s sugges t that per person income differ
ential s due
to differ ences in size of househ old tend to be greate r in the
LDCs
than in the DCs.
Of course , the relatio n just sugge sted may not be that simple
;
and the functi on connec ting size of househ old and income per
person
may not be the same for the LDCs and the DCs.
observ ation

But we make the

here to point up the line of conne ction betwee n highe r

fertil ity in the LDCs, larger averag e househ old, wider range
of size
of househ old, and hence possib le greate r effect s on differ ences
in
per person income associ ated with househ olds of differ ing size.
the highe r levels of fertil ity in the LDCs may affect not only
over- all levels and growth rates in per capita l produ ct, compa
red

Thus,
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with the DCs, but also the internal distribution of income by size
within the LDCs, compared with the DCs, associated with the wider
differentials in size of household in the former.
This last observation is also relevant to much of the writing
on size distribution of income in recent years.

It is almost entirely

based on data on household income, with some information on size of
household, but with classifications of households by per household
rather than per person (or per consuming unit) income.

Needless to

say, cross-section differences in distributions of households by size,
and changes in these distributions over time, would affect these
customary measures; and the latter alone could easily be misleading
if we are concerned with income per person (or per consuming unit)
rather than with income per household.

One should also note that the

emphasis on effects of fertility on size of household during the suc
cessive phases of the life-cycle of the household only strengthens the
conviction that adequate analysis of income inequalities within a
country must take account of the demographic components that affect
the size of household, and determine the life cycle

a household-

with its parameters different for the LDCs and the DCs, and its
possible changes over time within each.
7.

Concluding Comments
In concluding this paper, it may be useful to list the findings

bearing on the demographic corollaries of the much higher birth rates
(over 43 per 1,000) in the less developed market economies (LDCs),
compared with those (about 20 per 1,000) in the developed (DCs).
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These findings are based largely on international comparisons for
the 1960s.
(a) The age-specific fertility rates for women are, for each
age group within the childbearing span, consistently and significantly
higher in the LDCs than in the DCs.

Women in the LDCs begin bearing

children at earlier ages, and continue to bear them through later
ages, than women in the DCs •.

Also, the proportions of younger women

within the childbearing span is somewhat higher in the LDCs than in
the DCs--a factor only partly offset by the lower proportion of all
women of childbearing ages within the total population of the LDCs.
The higher fertility of the very young women (under 20 years of age)
and of the older women (35 years or more) in the LDCs accounts for
almost four-tenths of the total difference in the crude birth rates
between the two groups of countries.
(b) The higher age specific fertility rates of women below
age 25 in the LDCs is associated with a significantly higher
p1"0portion married in these young age classes--both as compared
with the DCs.

Indeed, intra-marital fertility rates for women

15-24 are somewhat lower for the LDCs than for the DCs.

The early

marriages of women in some of the major LDC regions (particularly the
populous countries in Asia, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding the
Communist) suggest a direct transition of a young woman from the
parental household to the household of her husband.

In the DCs, on

the other hand, young women spend several years on education and
work outside the parental household before marriage.
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(c)

The differentia l in the age of married men in the LDCs

and the DCs is far narrower.

This is true both at time of marriage

and within the married state.

The bridegroom or husband is between

5 and 8 or 9 years older than the bride or wife in the LDCs, as
compared with 2 to 3 years older in the DCs.

The composition of the

parental couple (even setting aside some incidence

of polygamy in

the LDCs), with regard to the disparity in age and experience between
husband and wife, is clearly different in

the LDCs from that in the

DCs--with implication s for decisions concerning births and children.
(d)

Given the extension of childbearin g to the more advanced ages

of women, and the substantial age excess of husbands over wives in the
LDCs, it follows that older fathers account for a larger proportion of
births in the LDCs than in the DCs.

The estimates suggest that fathers

40 years or older account for almost a quarter of all births in the LDCs,
but for only about a tenth in the DCs; and that a third of the total excess
of crude birth rates of the LDCs over thereof the DCs is due to births
associated with older fathers.

Thus, much of the difference in birth

rates between the two groups of countries is due to higher fertility
of younger women and to the excess of births associated with older men
in the LDCs, the greater motherhood of younger women,and the greater
fatherhood of older men.
(e)

The higher parity births (fifth or higher order) account

for almost four~tenths of all births in the LDCs, for less than one
tenth in the DCs.

This difference in the contributio n of higher

parity births accounts for almost six-tenths of the total difference
in crude birth rates between the LDCs and the DCs; and a substantial
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proportion is due to high parity births to older parents (women 35
years or older; men 40 years or older).

Thus much of the higher

fertility in the LDCs is due to high parity births, incurred despite
the presence within the household of well over three children, on the
average, and despite the more advanced age of parents, particularly
the father.
(f)

Given the larger number of children within the household

in the LDCs--and they can be only within the family household one of
whose main functions is to raise children to maturity and independence-
one would expect that in the LDCs the average household would be sub•
stantially larger and the proportion of the total population within fairly
large households much greater.

And, indeed, the household in the LDCs

averages about 5 persons, compared with 3.3 in the DCs; and the pro
portion of population in households of 7 or more persons is close to
one-half of the total population in the LDCs, and less than a seventh
in the DCs.

These results, which are consistent with the assumption

that fertility rates in the LDCs are over twice as high as those in
the DCs, raise intriguing questions concerning the impact of differences in size of households on the measures of inequality in the
size distribution of income among households or among persons.
Before we turn to the possible implications of these demo
graphic corollaries of birth rates for the factors that might explain
the persistence of the high birth rates in the LDCs, one other finding,
not explicitly considered so far, ought to be noted.

The high fertility

rates in the LDCs observed for the 1960s and persisting into the early
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1970s, have been maintained despite the fact that in most of the
less developed regions, death rates, in general, and infant mortality
rates, in particular, have declined substantially over the last three
to four decades.

Given the assumption that the desired number of

children was limited and below total capacity, fewer births should have heen
needed to achieve a limited total surviving children target.

Also,

in many of these regions other processes of modernization have spread,
either since the 1920s or 1930s, or at least since shortly after World
War II.

Such modernization should have brought about a modernization

of the demographic patterns, particularly lower birth rates and smaller
family units.
It would take us too far afield to document this observation
in detail.

~ut in view of the relevance of the death rates, and their

sharp decline in recent decades in the LDCs, we present a brief summary
of the worldwide data easily available, and we supplement it with data
for individual countries in Latin America, a less developed region the
records for which are relatively good, and the political independence
of which goes back a century and a half so that recent decades are not
disturbed by major political changes

like

those that have affected

most other less developed countries World War II (Table 11).
We eliminated Mainland China from the aggregates for the LDCs
because it is difficult to establish the basis of the China estimates
for recent years.

Three findings can be briefly stated.

First, for all

LDCs except China with the sharp decline in the crude death rates of
almost a half (from 30.8 to 16.4),the crude birth rate rose slightly.
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Table 11
Trends in Brith Rates and Death Rates,
Less Developed Regions and Countries
A.

Crude Vital Rates (per 1,000), LDCs and DCs, About 1937 and 1965-70
DCs
LDCs
China
Other LDGs
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

About 1937
1.

Birth rates

24.1

42.5

42.5

42.5

2.

Death rates

15.5

31.6

32.5

30.8

3.

Infant mortality rates

106

230

na

na

1965-70

4.

Birth rates

18.6

40.6

33.1

44.0

5.

Death rates

9.1

16.1

15.3

16.4

6.

Infant mortal
ity rates

27

140

na

na

Change, 1937 to 1965-70
7.

Birth rates

-5.5

-1.9

-9.4

1.5

8.

Death rates

-6.4

-15.5

-17.2

-14.4

9.

Infant mortality rates

-79

-90

na

na

B.

Vital Rates (per 1 1 000)

1

10 Countries in Latin America, 1920-29 (I) and
1950-59 (II)

Cumulativ e death
rates to age 5
I

Crude
death rates

Crude
birth rates

17.20

I
43.0
44.75

23.4

9.9

197.5

28.55

340.5

197.5

Guatemala

278.5

Honduras

210.0

II

I

II

Standardi zed
birth rates

II

I

II

37.3

40.65

37.15

44.55

42.6

44.8

45.55

45.15

46.0

47.45

16.65

48.4

46.45

na

na

33.45

18.85

46.85

47.9

44.6*

48.35

224.0

33.15

21. 7

48.75

49.95

na

na

131.5

23.1

13.7

44.2

46.0

43.6*

49.2

10.
11.

Chile
Colombia

338.0
256.5

145.0
192.5

28.85

13.10

23.05

12.

Costa Rica

184.5

115.5

13.

Ecuador

295.0

14.

El Salvador

15.
16.
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Table 11:
Panel B:

continued
concluded

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

17.

Mexico

291.0

147.0

27.55

13.05

44.8

45.4

40.45

47.6

18.

Panama

172.5

88.0

16.95

9.1

39.5

39.5

37. 7*

42.1

19.

Venezuela

242.5

121.0

25.3

11.55

42.15

44.25

na

na

f

Averages (Unweighted Arithmetic Means)

20.

21.

c.

7 countries
(except lines
13, 15 & 19) 256.0

145.3

25.3

13.7

44.1

43.7

42.2

45.2

All 10
countries

156.0

26.4

14.6

44.8

44.6

na

na

260.8

Crude Vital Rates, Latin America (ex. Temperate Zone), 1950-55 to 1965-70
Death Rates

22.
23.
24.

25.

Birth Rates

19501955

19551960

19601965

19651970

19501955

19551960

19601965

19651970

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Caribbean

15

13

12

11

38

38

37

35

Middle
America

16

13

11

10

46

45

44

43

Tropical
South
America

15

13

11

10

45

43

40

39

Total
weighted

15.2

13.1

11.1

10.0

44.4

42.9

40.7

39.5

na--not available

*-- the standard birth rate was calculated from the crude for 1920-29, using
ratios of crude to standardized for 1930-39 or 1925-29.
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continued

Notes
Lines 1-2:

Data from United Nations, World Populatio n Trend~ ~0-194-7

New York, December 194-9), Table 2, p. 10.
shown.

We took the mid-value of the range

DCs here comprise North America, Japan, Europe, and Oceania (but exclude

Temperate South America, a minor omission here and minor inclusion under the LDCs
as compared with line 3 or lines 4--6).
LDCs.

All other countries are included in the

China is identifie d with the region in the source designate d "Remainin g

Far-East

0

{after exclusion of Japan).

The populatio n weights used to combine

the rates are from Table 1, p. 3 of the source.

Lines 3 and 6:

From the UN Backgroun d paper prepared for the 1974-

World Populatio n Conferenc e, entitled Demograph ic Trends in the World and Its
Major Regions, 1950-1970 (New York, April 16, 1974-), Table 6, p. 15.
Lines 4- and 5:

From United Nations, The World Populatio n Situation

in 1970 (New York, 1971), Table 11, p. 18 (birth rates), Table 12, p. 32
(death rates), and Table 15, p. 4-6 (populatio n totals, used as weights in
distingui shing between China and other LDCs).
Lines 10 to 21:

Calculate d from the successiv e country tables in

0. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America:

New Estimates of Historica l

Trends and Fluctuati ons, no. 7 in Research Series of Institute of Inter
national Studies, Universit y of Californi a, Berkeley, 1965.

The source shows

quinquen nial averages, which we converted to initial and terminal decadal
averages.

The standardi zation of birth rates in columns 7 and 8 is for the

ages of women within the child-bea ring span (see pp. 42-47 of source for the
weighting ).
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Table 11:

continued

Lines 22 to 25:
above.

Calculated from the source cited for lines 3 and 6

The death rates arP. derived by subtracting rates of natural increase

(Table 7, p. 17) from birth rates (Table 5, p. 13).

The weighting in line

25 is by population in 1950 for the first quinquennium, average of 1950 and
1960 for the second quinquennium; 1960 population for the third; and the
average of 1960 and 1970 for the fourth quinquennium.
are given in Table 2, p. 2, of the source.

The population totals
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Infant mortality also declined, perhaps as much as four-tent hs.

Second,

for the ten Latin American countries in Panel B, both the cumulativ e
death rates to age 5 and crude death rates for total populatio n

declined

sharply from 1920-29 to 1950-59 (and could be shown to have declined more
from 1920-24 to 1954-59)- -the average decline in the former being about
four-tent hs and that in the latter somewhat greater proportio nately (lines
20 and 21, columns 1-4).

Over the same period, crude birth rates barely

changed; and when standardi zed for age structure of women within child
bearing ages

actually rose (line 20-21, columns 5-8).

Finally Panel

C shows that the decline in the death rates in Latin America continued
in the recent two decades, and the crude birth rates too began to
decline, but s1owly.

In fact, the total absolute drop in birth rates

over the last 15 years was somewhat less than that in death rates
(leading to a slight rise in the rate of natural increase) .

For many

of the populous less developed countries in Asia and North Africa (less
so for Sub-Sahar an Africa) similar rapidly declining death rates and
constant or slightly rising birth rates could be found--al though for
a somewhat shorter period than that covered for Latin America.
There have been other important moderniza tion trends in the
LDCs

over the recent decades when the high birth rates persisted .

We cite the evidence for Latin America to illustrat e rather than claim
thorough confirmat ion.

The proportio n of populatio n in "ur•ban ag1:-

glomerati ons"--urb an communiti es larger than small towns of up to 20,000
inhabitan ts--in the three subregion s of Latin America (excludin g the
Temperate Zone) rose from 10.8 percent in 1920, to 20,9 percent in
•
11
1950, an d to 29.2 percent in
1960.
This trend must have continued
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through the 1960s.

With urban defined differently (and using the

national definitions) the percentage of urban to total population
for all of Latin America rose from 40.9 in 1950 to 56.7 in 1970.

12

Also, per capita gross domestic product (in constant prices) must
have been risingatasignificant rate since the mid-1920s.

Approxim

ate estimates indicate an average rise between 1925 and 1950 of about
1.7 percent per year; between 1950 and 1970 of close to 2.6 percent
per year; and for the full 45 year period from 1925 to 1970, 2.1
percent per year--suggesting that the level in 1970 was over 2,5
.
th a t int
.
h e initia
' ' . 1 year. 13
t imes

One may assume that other aspects

of the social structure were also modernized in Latin America (e.g.
higher literacy and level of education, improved health, greater
levels of consumption),

However, the fact that birth rates failed

to decline means that modernization was partial, and may have failed
to affect some other aspects of the social and economic structure.
Finally, one should note that in two other less developed regions
the rough indexes of aggregate product per capita rose substantially:
from 1950 to 1970 in fast and Southeast Asia (excluding Japan) and
from 1960 to 1970 in Africa (excluding South Africa). 14
We come now to the question:
rates in the LDCs

why have the much higher birth

persisted through decades of declining death rates

and rising urbanization and per capita income?
possible.

Only conjectures are

The summary findings above, relating to the demographic

components of these high fertility levels are only suggestive of a
deliberate process.

And the extensive literature, bearing largely

on fertility differentials and trends in the economically developed
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count ries, is also only sugge stive, partic ularly with respec t
to the
transi tion theory .

The latter outlin es a paradi gm of a shift from the

tradit ional or pre-in dustri al to the modern demog raphic patter
ns; and
thus impli citly indica tes the factor s underl ying the "tradi tional
ly"
. h f erti·1·ity rates in
. the curren t LDCs. lS
h ig

But, as h as b een in
. d.icate d ,

one must allow for the differ ent fertil ity and morta lity levels
, and
the differ ent histor ical condit ions of the curren t LDCs c0mpa
red with
the vital rates and histor ical condit ions of the presen tly develo
ped
countr ies in their pre-in dustri al period s in the eighte enth or
nine
teenth centu ries.

The litera ture on demog raphic experi ence of the

LDCs is quite limite d, if only becaus e statis tical data have
become
availa ble only recent ly (and are still defici ent) and the accum
ulation
of analy tical result s has just begun. 16 Nor is it feasib le here
to
comb the limite d but still vast litera ture.

The attemo t is_

rather to presen t a few broad reflec tions, induce d partly by
the
eviden ce summa rized, partly by the readil y availa ble litera ture
on
demog raphic and econom ic patter ns.

These, we hope, will be of intere st

as at least indica tions of possib le direct ions of furthe r resear
ch.
It might help to group the factor s that could serve to explai
n
the higher fertil ity rates in the LDCs under three broad heads:

the

techno logy of birth contro l; the possib ly lower costs of larger
numbe rs
of childr en in the LDCs; the possib ly highe r return s from larger
numbe rs of childr en in the LDCs.

These three groups are not mutua lly

exclus ive, and each compr ises a wide range of subva riable s.

But one

can secure at least an impres sion of the relati ve magni tudes
of their
contri bution s to the demog raphic patter n to be explai ned, and
a notion
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of the identity of some of the subvariables.
As the quotation in footnote 16 indicates, even in the LDCs
In all of them some institutions and customs

fertility is controlled.

keep fertility below the biological potential.

This is a matter of

some importance, since it suggests that modernization may destroy or
weaken these institutions and customs before the new restraining
factors associated with modernization become fully operative.

But

the technoloey of birth control referred to above is clearly the
modern technology, that is far more readily available in the economical
ly developed countries.

In the DCs generally the population is richer

and more literate, the transport and communication systems are better,
and government has a more permissive or favorable attitude.

The implica

tion is that the modern, effective, technology of birth control is not
available to the population of the LDCs, because of high economic costs
of delivery, or the indifferent or negative attitude of the government,
or both; and that much of the high birth rate is due to unwanted births,
unwanted by the parents who could have avoided them, given more
effective control technology.
There is little question t h a t ~ group in every large popula
tion, whether in a 9-eveloped or less developed country, would have,
with better application of better birth control technology, avoided some
births that were unwanted.

However, "unwanted" is a term subject to many

ambiguities in application in quantitative research (unwanted as to timing,
or forever, unwanted under what conditions, and the like).

Nevertheless,

more effective technology and at a lower costs would have, in any population,
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net curbing effect on births--al most be definitio n of effective ness

and cost.

But how significa nt is such a factor, in explainin g the

vast different ials in fertility between the LDCs and the DCs?
Several weighty argunents can be adduced to suggest that it
is of limited importanc e.

To begin with, age at time of marriage,

particula rly of women, is clearly an important variable which can be
modified, as it has been in the past history of several European and
related societies , and thereby affect fertility significa ntly.
This, however, is a change in human and institutio nal practices , and
is little influence d by birth control technolog y more directly relevant
to intra-ma rital fertility .

Furthermo re, intra-ma rital fertility has

varied markedly among the current DCs in their pre-indu strial phase,
when birth control was far less advanced that it is today.

These

variation s find some parallels today among the less developed countries .
The two factors just mentioned yielded crude birth rates in the late
eighteent h century that ranged from 31 per 1,000 in Norway and Denmark
. f'inland, to 55 per 1,000 int
to 3 8 per 1,000 in
.
h e Unite
' d States. 17

If the spread of crude birth rates could be so wide with late
eighteent h century birth control technolog y, one wonders why the
current technolog y within the LDCs has been so inadequat e.

More

importan t, one may ask why, if more children were seen to lead to
economic misery, have the families in the LDCs not manifeste d a
sufficien tly strong demand for effective birth control means, a
demand that would overcome the indiffere nce of governmen t and the
obstacles connected with high costs.

After all, other products
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and aspects of modern technolo gy--rang ing from those that reduced death
rates so rapidly to the minor palatabl e products like radio sets and
Coca Cola--ha ve spread widely and been accepted .

If the argumen t is

that establis hed views and ideas, which persist despite changing events,
did not encompa ss the need for modern birth control technolo gy, then
the identifi able factor is not the absence of such technolo gy, but the
lack of demand for it.

Why, then, have the high fertilit y levels con

tinued to be wanted-- presuma bly by dominan t proporti ons of the popula
tion, if not by the small group who really desired fewer children but
were inhibite d by difficu lties in securing effectiv e tools?
In turning now to costs of, and returns from, children , we note
first that these costs and returns can be economi c, social, or psychol ogi
cal.

Then we may also ask what units weigh these costs and returns -

giving not only explici t, overt conside ration to these minuses and pluses,
but also intutiti ve response s that.nev ertheles s reflect real balance s.
Is it the parenta l pair, the larger family of which the pair is a member,
the larger blood-r elated collecti ve (tribe, caste, etc.), or even a
still larger aggrega te that sets the norms to which parenta l pair may
refer?

In the discussi on here, we emphasiz e the economi c and related

social costs; and given the structur e of LDCs, one must bear in mind
the possible referenc e of decision s regardin g the number of children
to norms establis hed by a much wider, if still blood-r elated, group
than the nuclear , or even the extended family.
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Under the largely rural, family business, conditions in the
LDCs, direct and indirect costs of a child are far lower than for
the competitive , nuclear family of an economicall y developed country.
In the latter much reliance is placed on the individual earning (or
social) power of the father, which would be adversely affected by
the economic and other burdens of many children.

In a developed

economy also the high earning and other power of the wife and wouldbe mother would be foregone, if her time and energy were absorbed in
childbearin g and child-rearin g.

Furthermore , in the developed societies

a much greater investment must be made in the rearing of children, so
that the direct inputs (as distinct from indirect costs) per child are
much higher than in the LDCs.

In the latter, only a small investment

is needed to rear a child to maturity as an effective economic agent
under the conditions of the country and the family.
There is little question that the absolute costs of children,
direct or indirect, are far lower in the LDCs than in the DCs.
related point may be added.

One

Because of the closer ties of family in

a less developed country to a larger, blood-relat ed aggregate, any
unusual costs of the specific family, particularl y in connection with
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children, may be covered, partly at least, by its associates within the
tribe, caste, or similar type of group.
Yet one must consider absolute costs in relation to the total
income of the family unit involved.

Are the direct ancl incHrPct

costs of a child in the family of a less developed country clearly loweJ.'
relative to the total income of the family than the greater costs of a
child in a family in developed country relative to its larger income?
If the potential income of the latter is X dollars, and it is reduced
to X-C by the direct and indirect costs of a prospective child, and
if the potential income of the former is X/K dollars and it is reduced
to (X/K) - (C/L), is L necessarily less than K (Kand L being larger
than one)?

Even if the proportional burden of the monetary magnitude

of the costs of a child are the same in the LDCs and DCs, with the
generally lower income in the former, the welfare burden would still
be greater.
But costs are not independent of returns.

They would be in

dependent only if we fixed the latter by assumption.

And one may argue

that returns are a major factor in any explanation of the persistence
of high fertility rates in the LDCs.

This judgment reflects the general

notion that societies, and groups within them, are responsive to
differential cost and return opportunities.

Although a long persisting

framework of such opportunities clothes the largely rational responses
in social norms and ideological garments, once the framework of costs
and returns has changed for families or for groups of families, the
adjustment should be relatively rapid.

If the response, in fact,
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deviates signific antly from the rationa l content , and if the lag, in
fact, is long, one must attempt to establis h, in a testable fashion ,
both the factors that underly the deviatio n and the mechanism that
generate s the lag.

Broad referenc es to peculia rities of human nature,

or to the existenc e of a lag, are merely descript ions of the puzzle,
.
18
rat h er tan
h
exp1 anations
.
If then we consider the returns from children , the implica tion
is that the families in the LDCs view children as a source of wealth,
the latter defined broadly as economic or social power.

Either in

weightin g costs against returns, or in adherenc e to social norms still
justifie d in their eyes, the families invest in children because they
view them as a source of economic or social gain.

This view may be

held also by the blood-r elated collecti ves larger than the family
househo ld or extended family, even reaching into the large politica lly
sovereig n aggrega tes.

But in our discussi on we shall be concerne d

primari ly with the family.
Three aspects of the investme nt in children may be distingu ished.
One is the economi c, labor-po ol aspect, the desire for more children
because under the rural or small family business conditio ns of the LDCs
they provide a supply of labor at the disposa l of the family

that,

after some years, provides economic savings and advance far greater
than any that could be generate d by the same family unit with fewer
offsprin g.

A crude calcula tion, based on reasona bly low mortali ty

rates and economi cal ways of raising the younger generat ion, might show
that the net contribu tion of an addition al child starting work in his
teens and continui ng to the early or mid-twe nties would be quite sub-
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stantial--if the child is male, and even if he leaves his family upon
.

marriage.

19

Nor should one overlook the possible contribution of an

additional daughter, not only from work within the family, but also in
many countries from the bride price or the benefit from the connections
with.the husband's family.
The second aspect of investment in children might be designated
the genetic pool aspect.

It is relevant to those less developed

countries in which, because of the inequality within the economic and
social structure, investment in greater personal equipment and further
education of few children is no assurance of upward social mobility.
In these societies mobility is blocked by monopolization of economic
and social power by a limited number of families.

Under such condi

tions, advance for the offspring of the lowly is a matter of success
based on personal characteristics and endowments, on a kind of genetic
lottery that may turn up a dictatorial corporal or general, or a
successful athlete (or their female consorts) so prevalent in many LDCs.
A rational calculation would encourage a family in such circumstances
to have as many children as can survive in passable health to maturity-
on the chance that one may be so endowed genetically as to raise not
only himself or herself, but also the family, above the low initial
level.

One should note that both the genetic pool and the labor pool

aspects of returns from children apply also to the lower economic
groups within the developed countries--particularly if these groups are
socially discriminated against.
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The third, and widest reaching aspect, of the investmen t in
children is that of security.

The latter involves not merely, and

not foremost, economic security of parents who, in their old age, have
to rely on,the help of children, reliance needed in absence of social
. . s f or sue h security
.
• most LD Cs. 20
provision
in

The scope of the

sec.urity aspect is much broader, encompass ing the protectio n against
natural and social calamitie s, which is not provided by governmen t
or other organs of society (not blood-rel ated)--an d must be supplied
by the family, or larger, blood-rel ated collectiv es.

The pressure

toward large families has been associate d with the weakness and un
reliabili ty of governme ntal structure in many pre-indu strial societies ,
and the need to rely on the family in a weakly organized community
that fails to provide adequate protectio n to the individua l member as
an individua l.

Even today, in many LDCs, the need to rely heavily

on the family, the tribe, or some blood-tie subgroup different from
the national community as a whole, is fairly apparent.

So long as

the condition s persist, an adequate increase in numbers of those related
by protectiv e blood-tie s will be a goal, justified even despite possible
. dvantages. 21
sort-term
h
d isa
To digress from discussio n of the family, one should note tre
decentral ization of authority and the intensifi cation of national ist
ties in the world in recent decades; and the prevalenc e within many
national states, particula rly LDCs, of regional and ethnic divergenc es,
only exacerbat ed by uneven p~essures of modern economic growth.

In

these condition s, despite the Malthus argument that the quality of

87

population is important, the quantity of population has become charged
with political significance, and has turned into a tool in international
and intra-national contests and potential conflicts.

The continuing

controversy in Nigeria concerning reliability of the regional population
totals in the several censuses is one illustration of the value ascribed
to numbers.

And the recent stand by Brazil (at the 1974 Bucharest World

Population Conference) on its own population-growth aims is another il
lustration that,"in the international power game, numbers are not a
sign of weakness but of strength.

This is not to deny the desire of

Brazil to spread a larger population over its wide open spaces; but it
does reflect a viewpoint, shared by the governments of many other LDCs,
large and small, that see advantages in larger numbers.

These advantages

may be envisioned as wider domestic markets and a larger labor force for
exploiting unutilized resources, or as a larger protective reserve in a
world still beset by international tensions, armed conflicts, and possibly
enormous dangers associated with some aspects of modern technology.

In

any case, the LDCs, in particular, tend to see in larger population a
source strength that they may lack, relative to the DCs, in technology
and material capital.
In short, while there may be some validity to the statement that
LDCs are poor because they are prolific, it may be said that they
are prolific because they are poor.

To put it more precisely, they

are prolific because under their economic and social conditions

large

proportions of the population see their economic and social interests
in more children as a supply of family labor, as a pool for a genetic
lottery, and as a matter of e~onomic and social security in a weakly
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organize d, non-pro tecting, society.

Furtherm ore, while the private

interest s of the parenta l generati on may be in conflic t with the long
term economic interest s of the nationa l communi ty, there is some
agreeme nt between the two when we relate families to larger blood-t ie
groups within the nation

and conside r the family and the nation in

terms of externa l security interest s in a divided and dangero usly tense
world.
It is hardly necessar y to emphasiz e the specula tive charact er
of the comments just made.

Yet they are suggeste d by, and are consiste nt

with, the implicat ions of much of the statisti cal evidence summari zed. 22
The conjectu res would be more useful if some attentio n were given to
compone nts of change within countrie s.

Thus, it may be that the declinin g

death rates and rising income per capita had differen t impacts on dif
ferent groups within the LDCs.

It may be that the fertilit y for some

moderni zing groups declined , but that of other groups increase d, with
greater health and nutritio n and relaxati on of traditio nal restrain ts.
In that case, the persiste nce of high aggrega te fertilit y rates would
be the result of a balance of conflict ing trends within the populat ion,
promisin g a decline as the relative weights of the groups shift.

But

it was not feasible to pursue these hints here; and in any case, there
would be serious data problems in the way.
Nor is it feasible here to discuss the policy implica tions of
the situatio n suggeste d by the double stateme nt that LDCs are poor
because they are prolific and prolific because they are poor--ex cept
to indicate that in many similar situatio ns in the past innovati ve
breakthr oughs brought about changes in economi c and social institut ions
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and led to the emergence and spread of groups pioneering in new and
modern directions.
Finally, one must stress that the above comments constitute
judgments on the importance of various groups of factors that might
explain the persisting high birth rates in the LDCs--for which I have
no quantitative weights derived from tested evidence.

They should,

therefore, be viewed as tentative and rough, although plausiblY
inferred from the demographic patterns summarized.
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Footno tes

1

see Frank Lorime r and others, Culture and Human Fertili ty (Paris,

UNESCO, 1954), pp. 52-53; quoted in United Nation s, Popula tion Bullet
in,
no. 7, 1963 (New York, 1965), p. 101.

Section VII of this Bullet in, pp.

10121, has extensi ve discuss ion of age pattern s of fertili ty.
Fecund ity is the physio logical capacit y of woman for procre ation, and
is charac terized by a rather narrow ly defined span with greatly varying
levels within the span.
2
High total fertili ty, even higher than that for the less develop ed
countr ies today, was shown in the past in some of the curren tly more
develop ed
countr ies--bu t always with a low birth rate for the younge r age class.

Thus,

in Europea n Russia in 1897, total fertili ty was as high as 7,060, but
the
rate for the 15-19 class was only 30; similar rates for Bulgar ia for
1901-05
were 6,570 and 23; for Serbia and Croatia -Slavo nia combine d in 1910,
5,595
and 44 (see Robert R. Kuczyn ski, The Balance of Births and Deaths , Vol.
II,
variou s tables, The Institu te of Econom ics of the Brookin gs Institu tion,
New York, 1931).

In the success or states-- USSR, Bulgar ia, and Yugosl avia-

total fertili ty rates for the mid-19 60s, accord ing to United Nations
source s,
ranged from 2,075 for Bulgar ia to 2,695 for Yugosl avia.
If we group the 52 countr ies covered in lines 1-5 of Table 1, i.e.,
all the less develop ed, includi ng Hong Kong and Singap ore, in descend
ing
order.o f the birth rate for the younge r age group, 15-19, and strike
group
averag es, the followi ng associa tions are reveale d:
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Footnote 2 (continued) :
Averages of Age Specific Birth Rates, Countries Grouped in Declining Order
of the Rate for the 15-19 Class
Groups (Number
of countries
in parentheses )

Changes

Total

15-19

20-24

25-29

(1-2)

(2-3)

Fertility

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1.

Top (6)

239

309

289

70

-20

6,665

2.

II (6)

173

305

285

132

-20

6,455

3.

III (7)

147

310

294

163

-16

6,155

4.

IV (7)

136

288

298

152

10

6,030

5.

V (7)

124

308

339

184

31

6,745

6.

VI (7)

105

299

322

194

23

6,435

7.

VII (6)

75

265

291

190

26

5,885

8.

VII (6)

45

244

299

191

55

5,250

As the rate for the youngest class declines, the change in the rate
from the 20-24 to the 25-29 class shifts from a minus to a plus, thus
indicating the movement of the peak toward later ages.

Even more inter

esting is the fact that through the sixth of the eight groups, total
fertility shows no decline.

This is because the declire of more than 100

points in the age specific rate for the 15-19 class is offset by the rise
in the rates at the later ages.

3
The underlying population data here are from the Demographic Yearbook,
1965 (New York, 1966).

The total for the LDCs is the weighted average for

the four regions; and the rate for each region is the weighted average of the
subregions (Other Asia, Middle South Asia, and South East Asia for ESE Asia;
Southwest Asia and North Africa for the Middle East; the rest of Africa,
except South Africa for the Sub-Saharan region; and Latin America, excluding
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Footnote 3 (continue d):
the Temperate Zone, for Latin America).

For the DCs I took Northern and

Western Europe, and Italy to represent Europe; North America, Australia and
New Zealand for the overseas offshoots ; and Japan.

The crude birth rates

for 1960-64 are given in the sources for Table l; and we used the sum of
populatio ns in 1960 and 1964 as weights.
·4 see e.g. Table 21 of United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1969
(New York, 1960), the latest volume emphasizi ng data on natality.

The high

proportio ns of illegitim ate births shown for many Latin American countries
(and some-in Asia) reflect the prevalenc e of consensua l marriages .

Since

we include consensua l with legal marriages , such births must be treated as
legitimat e.
5

See discussio n of table on marital status (Table 7) in United Nations

Demograph ic Yearbook, 1968 (New York 1969), pp. 21-22.
6
Some confirmat ion of the findings is suggested by the rather meager
data on age distribut ions of brides and grooms in the LDCs (compared with
the DCs).

For five countries in the Middle East and six countries in Latin

America we have the median ages of brides and grooms and those of married
men and women (consensu al marriages excluded) --both groups covered only
through age classes 15-49.

In the tabulatio n below we compare these with

similar data for twelve countries in the DC group.
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Footnote 6 (continued):
Median Ages of Brides and Married Women, and of Bridegrooms
and Married Men, LDCs and DCs, 1960s
(for brides and wives below 50)
Median
age,
Bride
(1)

1.

CorresDifferponding age, ence
groom
(2-1)
(3)
(2)

DifferMedian
Corresage, ponding age, ence
husband
(5-4)
wife
(6)
(4)
(5)

Middle East,
5 countries

20.3

26.3

6.0

31.l

39.2

8.1

Latin America,
6 countries

22.0

26.2

4.2

32.1

37.2

5.1

3.

ME and LA

21.2

26.2

5.1

31.6

38.2

6.6

4.

Developed
Countries

22.7

25.4

2.7

35.3

38.2

2.9

2.

Notes:
Underlying data are from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1968· (New
York, 1969),

Table

27 (for age at marriage) and Table 7 (for distribution by

age and marital status).
In general, the year of marriage was assumed to lie between 3 and 5 years
before the year for which marital status was reported.
Countries covered in the Middle East are Iraq, Jordan, UAR, Tunisia, and
Algeria; for Latin America--Mexico , Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, Chile, and
Venezuela.

The consensual category was omitted and the two regions were weighted

equally.
The DCs covered are the eight largest countries in Europe, all overseas off
shoots except New Zealand, and Japan.
those used in the text tables.

The weights for the three regions were

In deriving the age partition values for men

corresponding to the median age of bride (wife), we matched younge.r groups (husbands)

94
Footnote 6 (continued):
with younger brides (wives).

For medians this implies no internal matching

within the age distribution, since the full-range of the younger groups
(husbands) is assumed to correspond to the total 15-49 range of brides (wives).
Both the excess of age of husband over wife and the excess of age of
group over that of bride are wider in the LDCs than in the DCs.

Moreover,

the spread is somewhat wider for ages of wives and husbands than for ages
of brides and grooms in the LDCs (from 5.1 to 6.6 years), not true of DCs (where
it changes from 2.7 to 2.9 years).

The wife-husband population is, of course,

older than the bride-groom--an d the widening of the excess of ages of husband
over wife, compared with groom over bride, suggests the tendency observed in Table
5, for the excess of the age of husband over wife to rise as the wife grows
older--particul arly notable in the LDCs, but rather minor in the DCs.
Needless to say, because countries in ESE Asia (particularly India, Pakistan,
and Indonesia) and in Sub-Saharan Africa are omitted, the median age for the
bride among the LDCs in the tabulation just shown is too high.

Hence, the

difference between the LDCs and the DCs in the median age of brides in lines
3 and 4, col. 2 is underestimated.
7
see 0. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America:
of Historical Trends and Fluctuations.

New Estimates

Research Series no. 7, Institute of

Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1965.

The estimates are taken

from Tables 11, 16, 19, 22, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 44, 47, and 50, pp. 66, 81,
89, 99, 116, 121, 127, 135, 144, 154, 160, and 169.
8
The quotation is from p. 6 of the United Nations manual on Methods of
Projecting Households and Families, referred to as the main source for Table
10 below.

A useful, if summary, discussion of the concepts of family and

hold is found on pp. 5-12.
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9
The data are from the United Nations working paper, Population
Estimates by Regions and Countries, 1950-1960, ESA/P/WP.

31, May 1970.

.
.
lOF or i ll ustrative
States see my paper, "Incomedata for the United
O

Related Differences in National Increase:

Bearing on Growth and Distribution

of Income," in Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Nations and Households
in Economic Growth, Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, New York, 1974, Tables
1 and 2, pp. 130 and 133.

Evidence for Taiwan and the Philippines indicates

that.this negative association between size of household and income per person
is found also in the LDCs.
11

s ee

Un"i ted

b
and Rura1 Popu 1 at"ion,
Growth of t h e World' s Uran
.
Nations,

1920-2000 (New York, 1969), Table 47, p. 115, and Table 48, p. 116.

12

see the United Nations background paper prepared for the 1974

World Population Conference, cited for Table 11, lines 3 and 6, Table 14,

p. 30.
13

The estimates for 1925-1950 are from Alexander Ganz, "Problems and

Uses of National Wealth Estimates in Latin America," in Raymond Goldsmith and
Christopher Saunders, eds., Income and Wealth Series No. VIII (Bowes and Bowes,
London, 1969), Table III, p. 226.

The estimates for 1950-60 and 1960-70 are

from Table 6B of United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969:
vol. II, International Tables (New York, 1970), and Yearbook of National Accounts
Statistics, 1972, vol. III, International Tables, (New York, 1974).
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14The sourc e for
1950- 60 is the Unite d Natio ns Yearb ook, 1969 and for
1960- 70, the Yearb ook, 1972, both cited in footn ote 13.
Asia

For East and South east

the annua l growt h rate for 1950- 70 in gross dome stic
produ ct per capit a

was somew hat over 2 perce nt, yield ing a cumu lative rise
of 50 perce nt over the
two decad es; that for Afric a for 1960- 70 was only sligh
tly lower . It must be
noted , howev er, that these are aggre gates , and make no
allow ance for diverg ences
among count ries or for income ineou alitie s withi n count
ries.
15 For an illum
inatin g sunnnary of the trans ition theor y and the modi
fi

catio ns in it in the light of curre nt resea rch see A.
J. Coale , "The Demo graphi c
Trans ition Recon sidere d," a paper prese nted at the Liege
1973 Inter natio nal
Popul ation Confe rence of the Inter natio nal Union for
Scien tific Study of Popul a
tion, pp. 53-72 .
16 rn the
1953 Unite d Natio ns volum e, The Deter minan ts and Conse
quenc es

of Popul ation Trend s (New York, 1953) , which was a valua
ble comp ilatio n of
findin gs of studi es on the relati ons betwe en popul ation
chang es and econo mic
and socia l condi tions, the sunnnary of Chapt er V noted
that stati stica l data
on ferti lity are lackin g, parti cular ly for "most under
-deve loped count ries"
(p. 96. par. 141) and in refer ring to facto rs that accou
nt for high ferti lity
("in the neigh borho od of 40 per thousa nd" p.97, par.
145) notes "fact ors such
as the nearl y unive rsal marri age of women at young ages
and the absen ce of the
use of birth contr ol measu res."

But the sunnnary also notes that even these

LDCs have "inst itutio ns and custom s which reduc e ferti
lity subst antia lly below
the biolo gical poten tial."
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Footnote 16 (continu ed)
The revised edition of the volume, United Nations , The Determin ants and
Consequ ences of Populati on Trends:

New Summary of Findings on Interact ion of

Demogra phic, Economic and Social Factors, Vol. I (New York, 1973), contains
in Chapter IV a much richer discussi on of fertilit y levels and trends in the
high fertilit y (i.

~

LDC) countrie s; and a wider explora tion of the cultura l,

economic and social factors

behind them.

But the discussi on connnents on the

difficu lties of applying the past experien ce of the present ly develope d countrie
s
to the current LDCs (see paragrap h 134, p. 96); and, in trying to explain why
there has been little response of the birth rates in the LDCs to much higher
levels of income and lower levels of death rates, still
hold" hypothe sis.

emphasi. zes the "thres

The latter assumes that the moderni zation and economic growth

levels must reach some relative ly high level before effects on birth rates may
be expected .

But as I suggeste d in another connecti on, the hypothe sis is but

another name for the puzzle- -rather than a substan tive explana tion, that would
spec:f_-Fv

thP. factors that prevent sizable rises in income and

decl.inPr-: : "'" rl<:>::itb

from having an effect (see the connnents in my paper, "Econom ic Aspects of
Fertilit y Trends in the Less-De veloped Countri es," ins. J. Behrman , Leslie
Corsa Jr.

and Ronald Freedman , eds., Fertilit y and Family Planning :

A World

View (Ann Arbor, 1969), pp. 157-159 ).
17

For a conveni· ent summary o f t h ese vita
' l rates see

s·imon

Kuzne t s,

Modern Economi c Growth (Yale Univers ity Press, New Haven, 1966), Table 2.3,

pp. 42-44.

.,.ates
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18

This applies also to the "threshold" hypothesis referred to in

footnote 16, and criticized in my earlier paper cited in that footnote.
In that paper, I argued that in explaining the high birth rates in
the LDCs a rather limited weight should be assigned to the "purely econoic
social institutions and life patterns" (p. 101).

The seeming inconsistency

between the position taken then and the discussion here is due largely to
the narrow definition of the term "economic variables" in the earlier paper.
19

see the discussion in Mahmood Mamdani, The Myth of Population Control:

Family, Caste, and Class in an Indian Village, Monthly Review Press, New York,
1972.

This short book is based largely on interviews with members of dif

ferent castes in a Punjab village that was the focus of an earlier long-term
study and prolonged field effort at education in family planning and birth
control.

One cannot judge the validity of the results even in terms of the

given village, let alone their relevance to a wider field of population
experience and motivation among the LDCs.

But the book is useful in quoting

the reasons adduced by various occupational groups for having more children,
particularly sons.
20

see the analysis in papers by David M. Heer and Dean 0. Smith

which uses simulation techniques to derive the number of births required if,
given the mortality levels prevailing in the LDCs, a parental couple wishes
to assure a high probability that at least one son will survive to father's
old age.

The papers are "Mortality Level, Desired Family Size., and Population

Increase," Demography.,vol. 5, no. 1, 1968, pp. 104-121, and "Mortality Level,
Desired Family Size and Population Increase:

Further Variations on a Basic

Model," Demography, vol. 6, no. 2, May 1969, pp. 141-150.
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21 Th.
·
. particula
.
. cases of natur al ca1 amities
is argument app 1 ies,
. .
in
r, in
and breakdown s of civil authority in internal conflicts .

The vulnerab ility

of LDCs to such disasters , combined with the weakness of central authority ,
is obvious.

While natural and social calamitie s may raise the death rate

temporar ily.the sustainin g long-term effects making for higher birth rates
probably more than compensat e in the aftermath .
For a suggestiv e analysis of the key role of the family as a major
resource in a recent calamity see Robert W. Kates and others, "The Human
Impact of the Managua Earthquak e," Science, vol. 182, December 7, 1973
pp. 981-990.
22 M
'
'
' h those use d int
any o f t h e arguments are identical
.
h e transitio
. . n
wit
theory to explain "traditio nal" high birth rates (see the long summary quota
tion from Notestein in the Coale paper cited, in footnote 15.

